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1The legislation was first enacted in 1925. 43 'STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S. C. ??1-I5 (I946). It 
was approved February 12, 1925. Section 15 provided that the Act should take effect "on and after 
the Ist day of January next after its enactment, [namely, January I, I926] but shall not apply to con- 
tracts made prior to the taking effect of this Act." This restriction of the application of the Act re 
arbitration agreements made prior to the foregoing effective date of the Act, was recognized and applied 
in Ex parte di Simone, 36 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1929) on appeal from The Volsinio, 32 F.2d, 357 (E. D. 
N. Y. I929) in which the restriction appears to have passed unnoticed. 
Section I4 of the Act provided: "That this Act may be referred to as 'The United States Arbitration 
Act.' " 
Legislative reports upon the Act while it was pending in the Congress as a bill are as follows: 
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY REPORT (COMMITTEE REPORT 96), 68th Cong., Ist Sess., accompanying 
H. R. 646, United States Arbitration Act of February I2, 1923, referred to in this Article as H. R. No. 96 
and Senate Report No. 536, 68th Cong., Ist Sess., referred to in this Article as SEN. REP. No. 536. 
The statute was carried into THE CODE OF THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 44 STAT. 
I67, Title 9, entitled "Arbitration" (I926). In the Preface to this Code of the Laws of the United 
States it is stated that: "This Code is the official restatement in convenient form of the gener~l 
and permanent laws of the United States in force December 7, I925, now scattered in 25 volumes- 
i.e., the Revised Statutes of 1878, and volumes 20 to 43, inclusive, of the Statutes at Large. No new 
law is enacted and no law repealed. It is prima facie the law. It is presumed to be the law. The 
presumption is rebuttable by production of prior unrepealed Acts of Congress at variance with the 
Code" (44 STAT. V). 
Subsequently the statute was included in the United States Code, I940 edition, as Title 9, entitled 
"Arbitration." 
In I947 this legislation was repealed, with the proviso, however, that "any rights or libilities now 
existing under such repealed sections or parts thereof shall not be affected by such repeal." The 
original Act and Title 9 of the U. S. C., I940 Edition, were reenacted except that former Section I4, 
supra, naming the Act, was omitted and former Section I5 was renumbered as Section 14 and amended 
to read: "This title shall not apply to contracts made prior to January I, 1926." 6I STAT. 669 (I947), 
9 U. S. C. ?I4 (Supp. I95I). 
The original Act was entitled "An Act to make valid and enforceable written provisions or agreements 
for arbitration of disputes arising out of contracts, maritime transactions, or commerce among the 
States or Territories or with foreign nations." 43 STAT. 883 (1925). 
The 1947 Act was entitled "An Act to codify and enact into positive law, title 9 of the United 
States Code, entitled 'Arbitration.' " Then followed the enacting clause as follows: "Be it enacted by 
the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Title 
9 of the United States Code, entitled 'Arbitration,' is codified and enacted into positive law and may be 
cited as '9 U. S. C., ? ,' as follows." This Act incorporated catch lines preceding each section in the 
body of the Act which were the same as those in THE CODE OF THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, 44 STAT. I67, Title 9, and in 9 U. S. C., I940 Edition. In the 1947 Act they were not 
included in the section as in 1940 and the prior Code of the Laws of the United States; they were 
placed above the section. Above "?I" is the catch line: "'Maritime Transactions' and 'Commerce' 
Defined; Exceptions to Operation of Title"; above "?2": "Validity, Irrevocability, and Enforcement of 
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agreerrents under the Act and to the remedies provided in the Act to render such 
agreements irrevocable and enforceable. Accordingly, consideration of judicial de- 
terminations upon the first five sections of the Act constitutes the major part of 
this article. The review is intended to point up a variety of issues many of which 
are important to those who may be concerned with arbitration of either commercial 
or labor controversies under the Act. Some of these questions derive in part from 
frailties in drafting the Act and in part from views advanced by some of the courts 
in resolving those frailties in the course of litigation. Some accrue more directly 
from the case law made by the courts without much reference to limitations or un- 
certainties of statutory text. In some instances contradictory determinations of the 
same issue have been made by two or more courts of appeals. In some instances 
decisions by the district courts would escape these contradictory determinations on 
grounds not considered by the court of appeals. Doubtless some day the Supreme 
Court will resolve some of these diversities. In the meantime, it must be reckoned 
that the law of the Act may be different in one or more respects in one circuit from 
what it is in another. 
It may be noted, in passing, that these diversities and contradictions are not 
readily correlated with any declared attitude of the judges toward the Act or toward 
arbitration or arbitration agreements generally. Common law tradition has taught 
judges and lawyers alike to look askance upon arbitration agreements prior to award 
rendered.2 Some judges who have commented upon the matter have urged a "new 
Agreements to Arbitrate"; above "?3": "Stay of Proceedings Where Issue Therein Referable to Arbitra- 
tion"; above "?4": "Failure to Arbitrate Under Agreement; Petition to United States Court Having 
JurisdictiLon for Order to Compel Arbitration; Notice and Service Thereof; Hearing and Determination"; 
above "?5": "Appointment of Arbitrators or Umpire." Other catch lines appear above the remaining 
sections. 
This Act was approved July 30, I947. 6i STAT. 669 (I947), 9 U. S. C. ??I-I4 (Supp. 1951). Except 
in the foregoing matters the texts of the original and subsequent enactments appear to be substantially 
the same. 
The foregoing detail might have seemed inconsequential, except that the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit has recently concluded that the foregoing addition of the catch line above ?i, was 
sufficient cause to reverse certain of its views taken in earlier cases. See Amalgamated Association of 
Street Etc. Employees v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 192 F.2d 310 (1951) discussed infra, p. 614. 
General references to the codification also appear in Uniao De Transportadores Para Importacao E 
Comercio, Ltda. v. Companhia De Navegacao Carregadores Acoreanos, 84 F. Supp. 582 (E. D. N. Y. 
1949), and in International Union United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 
i68 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. I948). 
In this article the legislation is generally referred to as the United States Arbitration Act, or the Act, 
and, except as otherwise indicated, all references to, and quotations from, the Act are to and from the 1947 
Act. 
2 Common law revocability and non-enforceability have been ruled into such agreements in almost 
all American jurisdictions where the issues have been adjudicated (in several jurisdictions the issues 
have never been determined). Common law revocability rests on two particulars: (I) revocability of 
the agreement and of the authority of all persons under it by due notice given by a party thereto before 
award rendered thereunder; and (2) revocability by action, whereby a party can sue in court in dis- 
regard of the arbitration agreement and the party-defendant cannot effectively plead the agreement for 
a stay pending arbitration, nor in abatement or in bar of the action. These two specifications of common 
law revocability are frequently referred to in this article as "revocability by notice" and "revocability by 
action," respectively. 
Common law non-enforceability refers to the denial of any remedy seeking specific performance of 
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orientation," and that the Act should not be given "a grudging type of construction 
carried down from the days of judicial hostility to all arbitration agreements." Others 
have voiced traditional warnings against arbitration. The impact of the particular 
view is sometimes rather clearly recognized in the decision; in other cases it is not. 
In 1942, Judge Frank, in an opinion for the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit,3 after an extended review of Anglo-American rationale for common law 
revocability and non-enforceability of arbitration agreements, assigned the substance 
of its being to "judicial hostility to arbitration,"4 and urged a "new orientation" in 
causes coming under the Act. He said:5 
In the light of the clear intention of Congress, it is our obligation to shake off the old 
the arbitration agreement such as a general decree against the recalcitrant party to perform, or court 
appointment of part or the whole of an arbitral board with power to act when the recalcitrant party 
refuses to cooperate in that particular. 
This common law non-enforceability rests more in judicial lore than in positive decisions. The 
decisions ruling common law revocability have been thought, however, to indicate a high degree of 
probability of correlative decisions of non-enforceability were the relief to be sought. 
Common law revocability and non-enforceability have been read into both classes of arbitration 
agreements in general usage, namely, (I) provisions for arbitration of controversies which may arise 
between the parties in the future, and (2) agreements of submission of existing controversies. 
In a few states common law revocability (by action, at least) of arbitration provisions in contracts 
is more or less precisely codified by local statute. Idaho, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
and South Dakota have such statutory provisions. A similar piece of legislation in Pennsylvania was 
held an unconstitutional impairment of freedom of contract. Adinolfi v. Hazlett, 242 Pa. 25, 88 Atl. 
869 (19I3). See STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS, ?I5 (1930). 
The tradition of common law revocability and non-enforceability of arbitration agreements stands 
in sharp contrast from the common law conclusiveness and finality which are accorded awards and 
from the tradition of the courts both in equity and at law (and of the arbitration statutes) to narrow 
the instances or causes for which an award, once rendered, will be vacated or denied enforcement. See 
STURGES, op'. cit. supra, ?235. 
3Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., I26 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. I942). 
4Id. at 985. Some courts have thought it more appropriate to refer common law revocability (by 
action, at least) to the quite common constitutional provision that: ". . all courts are open, and every 
person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due 
course of law." Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Stankard, 56 Ohio St. 224, 231-232, 46 N. E. 577, 579 
(I897). See also, Cocalis v. Nazlides, 308 Ill. I52, I39 N. E. 95 (1923). 
And if common law revocability (by action) of provisions to arbitrate future disputes were dis- 
regarded some of the worst consequences that might result have been judicially presented as follows: 
"But a party cannot bind himself by contract in advance to renounce his right to appeal to the courts 
for the redress of wrongs. If this could be done an association might be formed in the state which 
would renounce our constitution and laws, and set up a different system of government for themselves, 
and in case of wrongs and oppression they would be debarred from resorting to our courts, and would 
be compelled to submit to the decisions of their own tribunals, and would most likely become 
dissatisfied and disorderly, resulting in riot and bloodshed." Myers v. Jenkins, Admr., 63 Ohio St. 1oI, 
I20, 57 N. E. Io89, 1093 (1900) (italics supplied). 5 I26 F.2d at 985. Absent applicable arbitration statutes, rare have been the instances of judicial 
"shake off" of traditional common law revocability or non-enforceability of arbitration agreements. It 
did happen, however, with respect to an arbitration provision in a written collective bargaining agreement 
in Bell v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 228 Ala. 328, I53 So. 434 (I934). The precise issue was revocability 
by action; it was denied. Consult also, with respect to an arbitration provision in a written construction 
contract, Park Construction Co. v. Independent School District, 209 Minn. I82, 296 N. W. 475 (I94I) 
with its citation in Knutson v. Lasher, 219 Minn. 594, i8 N. W. 2d 688 (I945). 
That common law revocability by action of arbitration provisions in written contracts was ruled out 
by the supreme courts of Colorado and Washington in their first decisions upon the issue, and that 
such revocability was denied in Pennsylvania with respect to such arbitration provisions which "named" 
the arbitrator, see STURGES, op. cit. supra note 2, ?I5. 
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judicial hostility to arbitration. Accordingly, in a case like this, involving the federal Act, 
we should not follow English or other decisions which have narrowly construed the terms 
of arbitration agreements or arbitration statutes. 
Later on in his opinion, however, Judge Frank saw fit on behalf of the court 
to caution, if not to chide, the "more enthusiastic" sponsors of arbitration against 
regarding it "as a universal panacea." "We doubt," he emphasized, "whether it 
will cure corns or bring general beatitude. Few panaceas work as well as ad- 
vertiseld."6 
In 1938, Judge A. N. Hand, in the same court, in a proceeding in admiralty and 
involving the Act, had served a judicial warning of rather traditional tenor to parties 
relating to arbitration as follows:7 
Arbitration sometimes involves perils that even surpass the "perils of the seas." Cf. 
Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N. Y. 284, 169 N. E. 386. Whether in any 
particular instance it is a desirable risk is not for us to say. It is a mode of procedure 
fostered by statute and in the present case invoked under the agreement of the parties. 
If they consent to submit their rights to a tribunal with extensive powers and subject to 
a most restricted review, they cannot expect the courts to relieve them from the effect of 
their deliberate choice. 
In the third circuit in 1943, in determining that Section 3 should be construed 
broadly and not restricted to arbitration provisions in "maritime transactions" or 
contracts involving "commerce" as covered in Sections I and 2 of the Act, Judge 
Goodrich declared the approach of this Court of Appeals to the Act as follows: 
"The generality of the language used in the statute [Section 3] does not suggest any 
self-imposed limitation. Nor do we think that the 'congressional approval of arbi- 
tration'8 should be so limited by implication, by a grudging type of construction 
carried down from the days of judicial hostility to all arbitration agreements." 
Again, "... we think the Act is entitled to a construction which will accomplish its 
purpose, and should not be hedged about with imagined limitations, as has been 
done in some instances"; and "we should not choke the arbitration process which 
has been given congressional approval by the fetters of earlier judicial conceptions."9 
I 
GENERAL PATTERN OF ACT 
The Act purports to embrace (i) a written provision "in any maritime trans- 
6 I26 F.2d at 987 n. 32. 
7In re Canadian Gulf Lines Limited, 98 F.2d 71I, 714 (2d Cir. I938). See also: Judge Garrecht 
in American Guaranty Co. v. Caldwell, 72 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. I934); Judge Hutcheson in American 
Sugar Refining Company v. The Anaconda, I38 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1943). 
8This quotation is from Justice Brandeis' opinion in Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester 
Service Corp., 293 U. S. 449, 453 (I935). 
'Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., I38 F.2d 3, 5, 6, 7 (3d Cir. 1943). 
See also: District Judge McGranery, in United Office & Professional Workers of America, C.I.O. v. 
Monumental Life Ins. Co., 88 F. Supp. 602 (E. D. Pa. I950); District Judge Weinfeld, in Lewittes & 
Sons v. United Furniture Workers, 95 F. Supp. 85I (S. D. N. Y. 195I); Circuit Judge Evans, in Dela- 
ware & Hudson R. Corp. v. Williams 129 F.2d iI (7th Cir. 1942); District Judge Mandelbaum, in The 
Aakre, 2!I F. Supp. 540 (S. D. N. Y. I937). 
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action" or in a "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce" (subject to 
the exclusion of certain contracts of employment to be considered below) "to settle 
by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction or 
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof," and (2) an agreement in 
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy "arising out of such a con- 
tract, transaction, or refusal." This is provided by Section 2. Section 2 of the Act 
with its catch line reads as follows: 
VALIDITY, IRREVOCABILITY, AND ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS 
TO ARBITRATE 
?2. A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a trans- 
action involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of 
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, 
or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of 
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
Subsequent sections of the Act provide precise remedies to effectuate the foregoing 
declaration of Section 2 that arbitration agreements qualifying thereunder "shall 
be valid, irrevocable and enforceable." These remedies include motion proceedings 
to stay the trial of any action, suit or proceeding brought in any court of the United 
States upon a cause embraced in such arbitration agreement (?3), to order a recalci- 
trant party to proceed in compliance with the arbitration agreement (?4), and to 
procure court appointment of arbitrators to act under the agreement when a party 
fails or refuses to participate in the original appointment or in filling a vacancy of 
the arbitral board (?5). Subsequent sections provide for the confirmation, vacation, 
and modification or correction of awards by motion proceedings (??9, IO, II). 
Accordingly, the Act follows the general pattern of the general arbitration statutes of 
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, and 
Wisconsin. 
II 
SCOPE OF ACT-ITS TIE-UP TO "MARITIME TRANSACTIONS" AND "COMNIERCE" 
As indicated above, Section 2 of the Act contains the general declaration of policy 
and purpose of the Act, namely, that provisions for arbitration of future controversies 
and agreements of submission of existing controversies which qualify thereunder 
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" except for cause as reserved in the 
saving clause of the Section, namely, "save upon such grounds as exist at law or 
in equity for the revocation of any contract." In order to qualify under the Act, 
agreements for arbitration must be either "a written provision" or an "agreement in 
writing" (?2). Oral agreements for arbitration are not recognized by the Act. 
Motion proceedings under Section 3 are precisely tailored to nullify common 
law revocability (by action) of arbitration agreements. They look to an order of 
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stay of trial of any suit or proceeding brought in any court of the United States 
upon a cause embraced in an arbitration agreement qualifying under the Act.10 
Motion proceedings under Section 4 afford summary procedure to gain a general 
order against a recalcitrant party to a qualifying arbitration agreement that he 
proceed with the agreement. This remedy overcomes common law non-enforce- 
ability of such agreements. Section 5 covers a special aspect of the enforcement of 
qualifying agreements by providing, as it does, motion proceedings to obtain court 
appointment of the original arbitral board when the recalcitrant party fails or 
refuses to participate in the selection thereof according to the agreement, or in filling 
a vacancy which may otherwise occur. 
It remains to consider how the Act ties up arbitration agreements otherwise 
qualifying thereunder with "maritime transactions" and "commerce." And why 
that tie-up? 
Section 2 of the Act is, by its terms, limited not only to arbitration agreements 
which are in writing, but also to (i) a written provision in "any maritime trans- 
action" or in "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce" to settle a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such "maritime transaction" or "contract evi- 
dencing a transaction involving commerce" (or arising out of the refusal to perform 
the whole or any part thereof), or (2) a written agreement of submission of an 
existing controversy arising out of "such a contract, transaction or refusal." 
"Maritime transactions" and "commerce" are defined in Section I of the Act." 
The Section, with its catch line, reads as follows: 
"MARITIME TRANSACTIONS" AND "COMMERCE" DEFINED; EXCEPTIONS 
TO OPERATION OF TITLE 
?i. "Maritime transactions," as herein defined, means charter parties, bills of lading 
of water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to 
vessels, collisions, or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of con- 
troversy, would be embraced within admiralty jurisdictions; "commerce," as herein de- 
fined, means commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Terri- 
tory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory 
and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between 
the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein 
10 No specific remedy is provided to overcome common law revocability by notice. None is provided 
in the state arbitration statutes of like pattern as the United States Act. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine 
what positive remedy would be practicable to overcome such revocability. Quite clearly the general 
declaration of irrevocability as set out in Section 2 with respect to arbitration agreements qualifying 
thereunder is mandatory and self-executing against the party giving the notice. Otherwise, the 
provisions of Sections 3, 4, and 5 might be brought to naught by a notice of revocation. For illustra- 
tion of how a court of the United States might be called upon to accord self-executing effect to the 
general declaration of Section 2 to defeat revocation by notice, consult State ex rel. Fancher v. Everett, 
I44 Wash. 592, 258 Pac. 486 (1927). 
1 In the original Act of 1925 the matters in this Section i of the 1947 Act were not given a section 
number; the 1925 Act began with these matters immediately following the enacting clause; there was 
no Section I to that Act; and the catch line above Section I of the 1947 Act did not appear in the 
original Act; there were, however, similar lines on the right margin of the Section. Concerning the 
significance of this detail, see supra note I. 
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contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any 
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. 
It is clear that Sections 2 and i purport to determine what arbitration agreements 
qualify under the Act. Section i is necessary to the understanding of Section 2 
in this connection. These Sections indicate that the Act is based upon written 
arbitration agreements concerning controversies which develop out of one or more 
of the designated transactions within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of 
the Congress or out of contracts evidencing transactions within the regulatory 
powers of the Congress over interstate and foreign commerce. Unless an arbitration 
agreement covers a controversy arising out of one of these transactions, apparently 
the Act is not intended to apply. It has been so held with respect to provisions to 
arbitrate future controversies.12 If the agreement is a provision to settle by arbitra- 
tion a controversy thereafter arising, it must be found in a "maritime transaction" 
or in a contract evidencing a transaction involving "commerce" to qualify. If it is 
an agreement of submission of an existing controversy, it is not required to be so 
located. The source of the controversy is controlling in both cases. 
Accordingly, it is thought that the terms of the Act do not extend to arbitration 
agreements covering controversies arising out of other and different sources even 
though such controversies may be subject to the established jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States either on the grounds of diversity of citizenship of the 
parties or as arising under a law of the United States.13 
12 This statement is subject to the exception ruled in certain cases considered in the next topic of 
this article that Section 3 is not so restricted. Some of these cases, however, imply, at least, that the 
Act otherwise (Sections 4 and 5, in particular) is so restricted. The cases cited herewith are either 
contrary to the foregoing decisions on Section 3 and have not been reversed or overruled by the court 
of appeals of the circuit, or they did not involve Section 3. Tejas Development Co. v. McGough Bros., 
165 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1947); In re Cold Metal Process Co., 9 F. Supp. 992 (W. D. Pa. 1935) (??4, 5); 
Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 54 F. Supp. 953 (M. D. Pa. 1944) (?4). See also, comment of Judge 
Learned Hand in Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Supply Corp., 70 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 
1934), quoted infra, note 39; Conley v. San Carlo Opera Co., 163 F.2d 30I (2d Cir. I947); In re 
Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co., 74 F. Supp. 85 (D. Minn. I947). 
It seems clear that it is sufficient if the arbitration provision covers a controversy arising out of 
either a "maritime transaction" or "commerce"; that if derives from a "maritime transaction," it is not 
necessary that such transaction also constitute "commerce." The Aakre, 21 F. Supp. 540 (S. D. N. Y. 
I937). See also The Gerald Fagan, 49 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1931); J. V. Lane & Co., Inc. v. O'Donnell 
Transp. Co., 9 F. Supp. 39 (E. D. N. Y. 1934). 
The limitation of the Act to arbitration agreements covering controversies from the two designated 
sources attends not only provisions to arbitrate controversies arising in the future, but also agreements 
of submission of existing controversies. Section 2, after identifying future disputes provisions as those 
covering "a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform 
the whole or any part thereof," identifies a written agreement of submission of an existing controversy 
as covering a controversy "arising out of such contract, transaction, or refusal." That state arbitration 
statutes of the same general pattern as the United States Act are not so restrictive as to the coverage of 
submissions of existing controversies, see STURGES, op. cit. supra note 2, ? 40. 
13 If the arbitration provision covers a controversy arising out of a contract evidencing a transaction 
involving interstate commerce (and not from a "maritime transaction" nor from a contract evidencing 
a transaction involving foreign commerce or general admiralty jurisdiction) it seems clear that the juris- 
diction of the federal court to grant the remedy of Section 4 or 5 will depend upon diversity of citizenship 
of the parties as well as the source of the controversy. Judge Learned Hand has given illustration 
of this as follows: "A citizen of New Jersey may enforce arbitration against a citizen of New York upon 
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It is not clear why the Act was so restricted. The legislative reports do not tell 
why.l4 The Congress, finding it expedient and desirable to require the courts 
of the United States to repudiate common law revocability and non-enforceability 
of written arbitration agreements covering controversies arising out of "maritime 
transactions" and "commerce" should, it seems, have found it equally expedient and 
desirable to accomplish the same objectives with respect to like written arbitration 
agreements covering other and different controversies over which the courts of the 
United States take jurisdiction by reason of diversity of citizenship of the parties or 
otherwise. 
There has been some judicial suggestion that the Congress did not have consti- 
tutional power to do so. This view has been advanced in certain cases involving 
the Act wherein consideration was given to whether Section 3 is confined to arbitra- 
tion provisions in "maritime transactions" and in contracts evidencing "commerce," 
or may be of more general coverage (we give consideration to this particular ques- 
tion in the next succeeding topic of this article). It seems to have been suggested in 
this connection that arbitration agreements covering controversies arising from the 
designated sources were fully within "the federal legislative domain," whereas the 
conferring of "validity to arbitration agreements generally" might be outside the 
scope of "federal power." At the same time it was further suggested, however, that 
the stay of trial of suits or proceedings as provided in Section 3 could be extended to 
all suits or proceedings in the courts of the United States, for Congress is not limited 
in regulating procedures in the federal courts by any limitations upon its powers 
to regulate "maritime transactions" or "commerce." It should be emphasized, 
however, that the question of constitutional power to extend the provisions of all 
sections of the Act to arbitration agreements covering controversies in addition to 
those arising out of "maritime transactions" or "commerce" and over which the 
courts of the United States take jurisdiction only by diversity of citizenship or other- 
wise was not precisely in issue in these cases. But the point was put by Judge 
Goodrich in the third circuit as follows:15 
The first section defines maritime transactions and commerce. Then the second 
section proceeds to lay down a rule of substantive law regarding the validity of an agree- 
ment for arbitration in case of any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a trans- 
action involving commerce. Congress was here making a rule concerning subject matter 
within its own constitutional legislative authority. It was not seeking to confer validity 
to arbitration agreements generally, a matter outside the scope of federal powers. Instead, 
it picked out two important classes of transactions within the federal legislative domain 
and declared the effect of arbitration clauses in agreements concerned therewith. 
a contract of sale which requires him to ship the goods from Newark to Manhattan, but not upon one 
where they are to go from Manhattan to the Bronx. Conversely, a citizen of New York may not come 
to the District Court to enforce arbitration against another citizen of that state, though the goods must 
be shipped across a State line." Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, Inc., 62 F.2d I004, 
ioo6 (2d Cir. 1933). 
14See infra note I6. 
5"Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., I38 F.2d 3, 5 (3d Cir. 1943) (italics supplied). 
587 
588 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 
Then in ?3 the statute deals with the conduct of suits in federal courts; again a subject 
matter of congressional power. The language becomes general: "any suit or proceeding," 
upon "any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitra- 
tion" are the words. Congress is not limited, in legislating as to law suits in federal courts, 
to those suits involving matters where the substantive rights of the parties may be con- 
trolled by federal legislation. 
Judge Parker, in the fourth circuit, ruling in accord with Judge Goodrich on the 
precise issue before them, advanced similar views on the question at hand and had 
reference, in so doing, to the legislative history of the Act. He said:16 
As introduced into Congress section 2 of the act provided for the validity and enforceabil- 
ity of arbitration agreements "in any contract or maritime transaction or transaction involv- 
1 Agostini Bros. Building Corp. v. United States, 142 F.2d 854, 856 (4th Cir. I944) (italics sup- 
plied). 
We have taken liberties with Judge Parker's last quoted sentence by inserting [arbitration] as 
indicated. It is believed that he meant "arbitration" contracts generally, because it is clear that the 
Act concerns the "validity" of such contracts only. With this amendment his text is conformed 
to that we have quoted from Judge Goodrich. 
It may be helpful to supplement Judge Parker's statement of the legislative history of the Act with 
the following detail. 
The original bill (HR 646), as recommended by the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
Representatives, read (disregarding italics and matter in [ ]) as follows in its first two sections: 
"Be it enacted, etc., That 'maritime transaction,' as herein defined, means charter parties, bills of 
lading of water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, 
collisions, or any other matters in foreign or interstate commerce which, if the subject of controversy, 
would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction; 'commerce,' as herein defined, means commerce 
among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the 
District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and 
any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign 
nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employ- 
ees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. 
"Sec. 2. That a written provision in any contract or maritime transaction or ['a contract evidencing 
a'] transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between 
the parties out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or 
an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, 
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 
The House Committee, in reporting the bill favorably, commented upon it in part as follows: 
"The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration contained in 
contracts involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction of admiralty, or which may be the 
subject of litigation in the Federal courts. It was drafted by a committee of the American Bar Associa- 
tion and is sponsored by that association and by a large number of trade bodies whose representatives 
appeared before the committee on the hearing. There was no opposition to the bill before the committee 
[Italics supplied]. 
"The matter is properly the subject of Federal action. Whether an agreement for arbitration shall 
be enforced or not is a question of procedure to be determined by the law court in which the proceeding 
is brought and not one of substantive law to be determined by the law of the forum in which the 
contract is made. Before such contracts could be enforced in the Federal courts, therefore, this law 
is essential. The bill declares that such agreements shall be recognized and enforced by the courts of 
the United States. The remedy is founded also upon the Federal control over interstate commerce and 
over admiralty. The control over interstate commerce reaches not only the actual physical interstate 
shipment of goods but also contracts relating to interstate commerce. .. " H. R. No. 96. 
Before the bill was reported favorably by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary the words in 
Sections I and 2 as italicized above were deleted and the words in [ ] were added. SEN. REP. No. 
536. 
There is no explanation in the Report why these changes were made. 
More of the Report is set forth, infra, p. 603. 
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ing commerce." The Senate Committee struck the word "contract" from the section and 
rewrote the language in its present form, so as to cover only maritime transactions and 
transactions involving interstate and foreign commerce. Senate Report No. 536, 68th 
Congress, Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., D. C. 44 F.2d I84. This was evidently done be- 
cause it was realized that Congress had no power to legislate with respect to the validity 
of [arbitration?] contracts generally but only as to the validity of those which related to 
matters subject to its control. 
Judge Parker appears, however, to have amended his foregoing views in the sub- 
sequent case of International Union United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hard- 
wood Flooring Co.17 In this later case he recognized that the remedies provided 
in Sections 4 and 5 of the Act are fully within the plenary jurisdiction of the Con- 
gress to regulate procedure in the federal courts as is the remedy provided in Section 
3. Reviewing the legislative history of the Act he noted once more the elimination 
of "any contract" from Section 2 but further observed that Sections 3, 4, and suc- 
ceeding sections providing, as he called it, for "compulsory arbitration under court 
direction," remained unchanged. Since these provisions deal with "procedure in 
the courts" it was his view that the Congress had "plenary jurisdiction." It seems 
clear that Section 2, in declaring that qualifying arbitration agreements "shall be 
valid, irrevocable and enforceable" constitutes a mandate to the courts of the United 
States to make such agreements so, and to accord the parties the remedies of Sections 
3, 4, and 5 to accomplish those ends. It does not purport to deal with the "validity 
of contracts [or arbitration contracts] generally"; it is a directive only to the courts 
of the United States and designates what remedies (Sections 3, 4, and 5) those 
courts shall accord the qualifying agreements. 
In line with Judge Parker's last cited views, it is doubted that any constitutional 
limitation required the Congress to restrict the Act with its mandate to the federal 
courts to written arbitration agreements covering controversies having their source 
in "maritime transactions" or "commerce" as it appears to have done. It is believed 
that the Act could have been extended as well to arbitration agreements covering 
other and different controversies which otherwise may be litigated in the courts 
of the United States under their established jurisdiction such as in cases of diversity 
of citizenship of the parties or otherwise. 
This conclusion is based upon the identification by the courts of the United 
States of issues of revocability and enforceability of arbitration agreements as matters 
of remedy or procedure which as respects the federal courts, are within the plenary 
power of the Congress. We also note the want of substance of traditional common 
law revocability and non-enforceability of arbitration agreements and the nature of 
the legislative reform in arbitration statutes like the United States Act. 
We present these considerations first, without reference to the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,l8 and then taking into account the 
ruling in that case and such subsequent cases as seem pertinent. 
17 i68 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948). 18 304 U. S. 64 (1938). 
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In a variety of cases decided before Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins and before the 
United States Act became effective the issue of revocability of arbitration provisions 
was held by the courts of the United States to be a matter of "remedy" or "pro- 
cedure" (not "of right") to be determined by them exclusively according to the law 
of the forum.19 The issue was identified and determined as a question of "general 
law; i.e., one wherein the courts of the United States are not bound to follow or 
conform to the decisions of the state jurisdiction in which they may happen to sit."20 
On the same basis the federal courts, prior to the United States Act, refused to 
honor a state or foreign arbitration statute, that, otherwise, might be applicable to 
render the arbitration agreement irrevocable. Revocability again was ruled by the 
federal courts in accord with traditional common law. One of the first of these de- 
cisions, Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line,2l involved a libel in admiralty upon a 
charter party. The charterers sued the owners of the vessel to recover alleged 
overpayments of charter hire. In refusing to stay the proceedings in accord with 
the New York Arbitration Law, Circuit Judge Mack observed as follows: "Arbitra- 
tion statutes or judicial recognition of the enforceability of such provisions do not 
confer a substantive right, but a remedy for the enforcement of the right which is 
created by the agreement of the parties."22 And "it is not within the power of the 
19 These rulings were made in cases involving revocability by action. They related to provisions 
in written contracts to arbitrate controversies that might arise between the parties in the future. By 
pertinent foreign, or state, law deemed applicable to the provision it was irrevocable by action. The 
provisions were held revocable by action by the federal court. 
In the following cases so ruling the jurisdiction of the federal court was invoked by libel in ad- 
miralty: United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. Ioo6 (S. D. 
N. Y. I915); The Eros, 241 Fed. I86 (E. D. N. Y. I9I6), afl'd, 251 Fed. 45 (2d Cir. 1918); Tatsuuma 
Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prescott, 4 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1925). See also, Aktieselskabet Korn-og- 
Foderstof Kompagniet v. Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten 250 Fed. 935 (2d Cir. I918). 
Accord, in non-admiralty cases: Mitchell v. Daugherty, 90 Fed. 639 (3d Cir. I898); Jefferson Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Bierce & Sage, I83 Fed. 588 (C C. E. D. Mich. 9IIo); Haskell v. M'Clintic-Marshall Co., 
289 Fed. 405 (9th Cir. 1923). 
20 The quotation is from United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., supra 
note 19, at ioII. 21 276 Fed. 319 (S. D. N. Y. I92I). See also, The Eros, 241 Fed. I86 (E. D. N. Y. I916), af'd, 251 
Fed. 45 (2d Cir. I918). Accord, in non-admiralty cases, the United States Act not being applicable: 
Voutrey v. General Baking Co., 39 F. Supp. 974 (E. D. Pa. I941); Karno-Smith Co. v. School Dist. 
of Scranton, 44 F. Supp. 860 (M.D. Pa. 1942); California Prune & Apricot Growers' Ass'n v. Catz 
American Co., 60 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. I932) reported, infra, p. 623. Compare Pacific Indemnity Co. v. 
Ins. Co. of No. America, 25 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1928) in which stay of trial was granted pursuant to the 
California arbitration statute. No reference was made to the United States Act, nor was the matter 
now under consideration discussed. 
22 276 Fed. at 323 (italics supplied). The decision was affirmed on appeal with an opinion of like 
tenor, 5 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. I924). In the interim, the Supreme Court had held that the arbitration 
agreement involved in the case was enforceable by application for a general order to proceed under 
the New York Arbitration Law in the New York Supreme Court, notwithstanding the controversy 
arose out of a charter party and was therefore a cause arising within the "admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction" of the courts of the United States. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109 
(1924). Id. at 123, 124. Said Justice Brandeis for the Supreme Court: "By reason of the saving clause 
[United States Judicial Code, ?256, 28 U. S. C. A. ?37I] state courts have jurisdiction in personam, 
concurrent with the admiralty courts, of all causes of action maritime in their nature arising under 
charter parties... A State may not provide a remedy in rem for any cause of action within the 
admiralty jurisdiction.. . . But otherwise, the State, having concurrent jurisdiction, is free to adopt 
such remedies, and to attach to them stch incidents, as it sees fit. New York, therefore, had the 
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state to regulate the procedure and practice of a federal court of admiralty."23 
In I931, the Supreme Court likewise identified the United States Act as a matter 
of "remedy" in Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus4 in which it was confronted 
with a challenge of the constitutionality of the United States Act. The point was 
advanced in admiralty proceedings that if the enforcement provisions of the Act 
(order to proceed with arbitration) were applied in admiralty, the Act would be in- 
compatible with the judicial power of the United States as extended to cases of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction by Article III of the Constitution. This ob- 
jection to the Act was denied by the Supreme Court on the ground that the Act 
was well conceived within the general power of the Congress "to provide remedies 
in matters falling within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, and to 
regulate their procedure."25 The views of the Court in this case as to the identifica- 
tion of the issue as one of "remedy" and those of the Court as advanced in Red 
Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Company26 were reiterated by Chief Justice Hughes as 
follows :127 
It was because the question was one of remedy only, that this Court decided that a State, 
by virtue of the clause saving to suitors "the right of a common law remedy," [Judicial 
Code, ?24(3); U. S. C., Title 28, ?41(3)] had the power "to confer upon its courts the 
authority to compel parties within its jurisdictions to specifically perform an agreement for 
arbitration, which is valid by the general maritime law, as well as by the law of the 
State" and is contained in a maritime contract made within the State and there to be 
performed. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., supra, at 124. The general power of 
the Congress to provide remedies in matters falling within the admiralty jurisdiction of 
the federal courts, and to regulate their procedure, is indisputable. The petitioner con- 
tends that the Congress could not confer upon the courts of admiralty the authority 
to grant specific performance. But it is well settled that the Congress, in providing 
appropriate means to enforce obligations cognizable in admiralty, may draw upon other 
power to confer upon its courts the authority to compel parties within its jurisdiction to specifically 
perform an agreement for arbitration, which is valid by the general maritime law, as well as by the 
law of the State, which is contained in a contract made in New York and which, by its terms, is to be 
performed there. 
. . . The Arbitration Law deals merely with the remedy in the state courts in respect of obligations 
voluntarily and lawfully incurred. It does not attempt either to modify the substantive maritime law' 
or to deal with the remedy in courts of admiralty." Id. at 123, 124 (italics supplied). 
23 276 Fed. at 323 (italics supplied). Only one federal case has been discovered in which this 
general issue was not disposed of by the same identification of the given state arbitration statute. Refer- 
ence is made to Lappe v. Wilcox, 14 F.2d 86i (N. D. N. Y. 1926). In that case, in an action brought 
by a Pennsylvania resident against a New York resident in the District Court for the Northern District 
of New York with diversity of citizenship as the ground of jurisdiction of the court, application for 
stay of trial based upon the New York Arbitration Law was denied. Notwithstanding the position taken 
in the earlier decisions in the second circuit (supra notes 21, 22) and by the Supreme Court (supra note 
22) identifying the New York Arbitration Law as dealing "merely with the remedy in the state 
courts," the decision was put upon two differently stated grounds as follows: (i) The New York Law 
could not deprive non-residents of the state, who otherwise could do so, of the right to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the federal court. (2) The terms of the New York Arbitration Law indicated that it 
was not intended that it should be enforced by any other courts than those of the state of New York. 24 284 U. S. 263 (I932). 
25 d. at 278 (italics supplied). 
26 :64 U. S. IO9 (1924), supra note 22. 
27 Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U. S. 263, 277-278, 279 (1932) (italics supplied). 
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systems .... Similarly, there can be no question of the power of Congress to authorize 
specific performance when that is an appropriate remedy in a matter within the admiralty 
jurisdiction . . . 
In this instance a remedy is provided to fit the engagement. The Congress has 
authorized the court to direct the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with a 
valid stipulation of a maritime contract, and to enter a decree upon the award found to 
be regular and within the terms of the agreement. We think that the objection on consti- 
tutional grounds is without merit. 
It also has been held under the United States Act that stay of trial shall be 
granted a defendant under Section 3 (the arbitration provision qualifying under 
the Act) although the action was originally brought in a state court (where the 
arbitration provision was revocable by local law) but was removed by the defendant 
to a federal court. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Parry v. Bache28 
so ruled in I942, stating "that the invoked statute being remedial, controls the pro- 
cedure in the federal court; and that the view the state court might take of the 
arbitration agreement is wholly immaterial." 
Such has been the identification at common law of issues of revocability and 
enforceability of arbitration agreements by the courts of the United States. They 
have been held to be matters of "remedy" and "procedure" to be determined ex- 
clusively according to the law of the forum. The same identification has been 
accorded state arbitration statutes and the United States Act making arbitration 
agreements qualifying thereunder, respectively, irrevocable and enforceable. These 
statutes have been held to involve matters of remedy and procedure in the respec- 
tive courts only. The remedies of the state statute have been denied effect as such 
in the federal courts. The same identification was used by the Supreme Court in 
sustaining the United States Act when its constitutionality was challenged for its 
extension into admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. 
The want of substance of common law revocability and nonenforceability of 
arbitration agreements and the expediency of legislative reform by arbitration statutes 
like the United States Act have been well summarized by Judge Cardozo in the 
decision sustaining the constitutionality of the New York Arbitration Law. He 
emphasized that common law revocability and common law non-enforceability of 
arbitration agreements, in so far as they have been adjudicated in the American 
jurisdictions, are judge-made law. As the courts so made these rules of procedure 
before them, so might they undo them and accord irrevocability and other enforce- 
28 
125 F.2d 493, 495 (5th Cir. 1942) (italics supplied). The arbitration provision was contained 
in a contract declared by the court clearly to be one "evidencing a transaction involving commerce." 
See also, Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, I42 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944), in which the Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit, although it saw fit to take note of the revocability of the arbitration provision under 
the law of the state of Kentucky from which the case had been removed to the federal court, declared: 
"An agreement that all differences arising under a contract shall be submitted to arbitration relates to the 
law of remedies and the law that governs remedies is the law of the forum. Such a contract, whatever 
form it may assume, affects in its operation the remedy alone." Id. at 88i (italics supplied). See also, 
Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Screw Machine Products Co., 73 F. Supp. 578 (E. D. Wis. 1947). 
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ment. Some state courts have done so with respect to revocability.29 And as the 
state courts can undo common law revocability and non-enforceability, and state 
legislatures can require them to do so, without infringing constitutional limitations, 
it seems clear that the courts of the United States can do likewise, or, in any event, 
that the Congress can require them to do so with respect to arbitration agreements 
covering any controversies which otherwise might be litigated in those courts under 
their established jurisdiction. Judge Cardozo set out the views of the New York 
Court of Appeals to which we refer as follows:30 
We think there is no departure from constitutional restrictions in this legislative declara- 
tion of the public policy of the state. The ancient rule, with its exceptions and refinements, 
was criticized by many judges as anomalous and unjust. (D. & H. C. Co. v. Pa. Coal Co., 
supra at p. 258; Fudickar v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 392, 399, U. S. 
Alphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. Rep. oo006, and cases 
there cited.) It was followed with frequent protest, in deference to early precedents. 
Its hold even upon the common law was hesitating and feeble. We are now asked to 
declare it so imbedded in the very foundations of our jurisprudence and the structure of 
our courts that nothing less than an amendment of the Constitution is competent to 
change it. We will not go so far. The judges might have changed the rule themselves 
if they had abandoned some early precedents, as at times they seemed inclined to do.... 
No one would have suspected that in so doing they were undermining a jurisdiction 
which the Constitution had charged them with a duty to preserve. Not different is the 
efect of like changes when wrought by legislation. 
It remains to take account of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins. Of course it had not 
been decided when the United States Act was originally enacted. It was not, there- 
fore, a deterrent at that time to the extension of the Act to arbitration agreements 
covering controversies arising from sources outside "maritime transactions" or "com- 
merce" but which otherwise might be litigated in the federal courts under their 
established jurisdiction. We are unable to find anything in the Erie case, or its 
successors, upon which to base a conclusion that the Congress does not have consti- 
tutional power so to extend the Act. We have observed above that prior to the de- 
cision in the Erie case the Supreme Court, in Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, saw 
fit to reiterate its identification of the New York Arbitration Law as involving a 
matter of "remedy only" for the New York courts and sustained the application of 
the United States Act with its remedy of specific performance in admiralty as being 
within the "general power of the Congress to provide remedies in matters falling 
within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, and to regulate their pro- 
cedure." We believe that this identification is still useful and that it may be relied 
upon to support the extension of the coverage of the United States Act as we sug- 
gest. 
29 See supra note 5. 
30Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N. Y. 261, 130 N. E. 288, 292 (1921) (italics supplied). 
See also Judge Frank's review of the background of common law revocability and non-enforceability as 
set forth in Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Co., supra note 3. Compare, Judge Hough 
in Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 5 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1924). 
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We are taught, and have easily followed the teaching of Justice Frankfurter in 
cases like Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,31 that matters of "remedy" or "procedure" 
and matters of "substance" define no "Great Divide cutting the whole domain of 
law" and that they (such names and categories) may be put aside in connection 
with the application of the Erie decision as "abstractions" until at least a specific 
issue is measured against the purpose of that decision. We also learn from the 
York case that "the nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that 
for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal 
court instead of in a State court a block away should not lead to a substantially 
different result"; that "the intent of that decision was to insure that, in all cases 
where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of cit- 
izenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should 
be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, 
as it would be if tried in a State court." And so whether a state statute of limitation 
is a matter of "substance" or "procedure" is to be judged only "in the aspect that 
alone is relevant to our problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result of a 
litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling 
in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a State court?" 
This requirement that the federal court in a diversity case shall duplicate the 
state court so that the outcome of the litigation in the federal court shall be sub- 
stantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, is 
quite remote from the issues of revocability and enforceability of arbitration agree- 
ments. Those issues are sufficiently unique and constant to give considerably con- 
crete content to distinctions between matters of "remedy" and "substance" even 
though, otherwise, those terms in first instances may assume the role of abstractions. 
If irrevocability and enforceability of the arbitration agreement is determined there 
will be no litigation in any court and there will be no question of assuring that the 
outcome of litigation in the federal court will be substantially the same, as far as 
legal rules determine the outcome, as if it were in the state court. Instead the 
controversy will be heard and determined by the arbitral board without necessity of 
following "the law" unless the parties so agree. In other words, the controversy will 
be heard and determined by the arbitrators serving neither as a federal or state court 
and free to disregard generally the law of the state which might control litigations 
as matters of "procedure" in any context or which might determine "substance" in 
any context. Otherwise stated, "the nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. 
Tompkins" to conform "the law" of the federal court to that of the state court to the 
extent that the "outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially 
the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of litigation, as it would be if 
tried in a state court" seems not at all applicable to the determination of issues of 
revocability and enforceability of arbitration agreements.32 
1 326 U. S. 99, I09 (I925) (italics supplied). 
32 A fit instance of the applicability of the intent of the Erie decision in connection with an arbitra- 
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Of course, if, in the state court, the arbitration agreement would be revocable 
and non-enforceable according to common law tradition, the controversy might be 
litigated there in lieu of arbitration, while, if the United States Act were extended 
in its coverage of arbitration agreements as we suggest, it could not be litigated in 
the federal court unless the parties waived or abandoned their arbitration agreement. 
In such case the federal court would not be able to duplicate "State law or State 
policy" with respect to the arbitration agreement, nor to hear and decide the contro- 
versy covered by the agreement in conformity with the requirements of the Erie 
case, or otherwise. But we do not understand that the Erie case restricts the power 
of the Congress so to restrain the power of the federal court to hear and decide such 
controversies. 
Such extension of the Act would constitute a determination by the Congress 
of its control over the law-making function-jurisdiction to hear and decide-of 
the federal courts. That jurisdiction would be limited by the extension of the Act. 
We find nothing in the Erie R. Co. case, or elsewhere, that purports to voice consti- 
tutional restraint upon the Congress to establish such limitation upon the federal 
courts in diversity cases or otherwise. And in this connection we are inclined to 
emphasize that the remedies of stay of trial (?3), order to proceed (?4), and court 
appointment of arbitrators (?5) are a team of remedies, each auxiliary to the other, 
designed to accord complete remedy under the arbitration agreement; their dis- 
tinctions are formal, not substantial, when measured by the declared objective of the 
Act (?2).33 It should be conceded that there will be preliminary proceedings- 
motions-to invoke the remedies of these sections. Issues may then arise as to the 
making of the arbitration agreement, its coverage of the given controversy, the free- 
dom from default under that agreement of the moving party, default thereunder 
of the defending party, and other "equitable considerations." The court will then 
be called upon to hear and determine such issues in order to determine the validity 
of the claim to the remedy of the given section. Regarding, as we do, the remedy 
sought as being matter of "remedy only" for the purpose at hand, so do we consider 
these preliminary proceedings and the hearing and determination of the validity of 
the claim to the remedy as ancillary to it and as being also matter of "remedy 
tion and award will appear as follows. The arbitration was had and award rendered under state 
law. The arbitration provision did not qualify under the United States Act. The award is challenged 
in common law proceedings in a federal court, either by defending against its enforcement or by plenary 
suit to vacate it. Clearly state causes to defeat the award should rule the determination of the validity 
of the award. See Tejas Development Co. v. McGough Bros., I65 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. I947). 
"3We are not unmindful of the broad language in Angel v. Bulll'ngton, 330 U. S. 183 (I947). The 
words are: "The essence of diversity jurisdiction is that a federal court enforces State law and State 
policy"; that "diversity of jurisdiction must follow State law and policy" (italics supplied). These 
are the words of Justice Frankfurter, who, again, as in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra, was dealing 
with the applicability of the "nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins" which he set 
out in the York case as quoted above. We do not read the foregoing language of the Justice as intending 
more than to be disciplinary of the federal courts in their hearing and deciding litigation in diversity 
cases. We do not read it as intending to indicate constitutional restriction upon the power of the 
Congress to require the federal courts to deny hearing and judgment by those courts in diversity cases in honor of a pertinent arbitration agreement between the parties. 
595 
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 
only." In short, we believe that the rationale and ruling of the Supreme Court in 
Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, may well be relied upon to support the extension 
of the Act as we suggest.34 
Relying upon the foregoing considerations, we conclude that, at the time the Act 
was originally enacted (1925), there was no controlling constitutional limitation upon 
the Congress requiring the Act to be restricted to arbitration agreements concerning 
controversies arising out of a "maritime transaction" or out of a contract evidencing 
a transaction involving "commerce." Probably, however, apprehension over the 
power of Congress in this connection deterred the extension of its coverage. It 
could, and should, we believe, have been extended to embrace arbitration agreements 
covering any other and different controversies over which the courts of the United 
States otherwise have jurisdiction by the laws of the United States to hear and decide, 
whether diversity cases or otherwise. We submit that the Erie case does not voice 
constitutional or other restraint upon the Congress to make such extension of the 
Act. 
It should be noted that the courts of the United States are not, of course, re- 
sponsible for the limited coverage of the Act. Indeed, they may be expected to ad- 
minister the Act as it was written by the Congress. 
On the other hand, it seems clear that the federal courts are challenged anew to 
determine whether or not they will adhere to ancient "judicial hostility to arbitra- 
tion" as to arbitration agreements covering controversies outside the Act which 
may be brought before them in due course of their jurisdiction. Except with 
respect to the exclusion of certain contracts of employment as set out at the end of 
Section i (which is considered in a separate topic below), it is difficult indeed to 
find in the making of the Act any positive purpose to relegate arbitration agree- 
ments outside the Act to traditional revocability and non-enforceability. At the most, 
it seems, such agreements constitute mere omissions without any implication of 
positive approval of ancient revocability and non-enforceability. The Act clearly 
indicated, to the extent of its coverage, a "new orientation," by denying traditional 
judge-made rules of revocability and non-enforceability of arbitration agreements, 
and it is difficult to imagine, in the light of the very existence of the Act, how arbi- 
tration agreements though outside the Act, may be gauged as against "public policy" 
just because they are not covered by the Act. The difficulty will be especially great 
34 It may be noted in this connection that, although the question of constitutional power was not in 
issue (nor was the Erie case referred to), substantial judicial opinion has been voiced that all of the 
present sections of the Act providing for enforcement of arbitration provisions may be extended to 
arbitration provisions in written contracts outside "maritime transactions" and "commerce." This 
opinion can be accumulated to cover Sections 3, 4, 5, and 8 of the Act as indicated herewith. It 
was voiced after the Erie decision except as otherwise indicated. Judge Goodrich in Donahue v. Sus- 
quehanna Collieries Co., infra (?3); Judge Parker in Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, infra 
(?3), and in International Union United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., infra 
(??3 and 4); Judge Manton in The Gerald A. Fagan, infra note 41 (??4 and 8; before the Erie case). 
While we doubt, as set forth later, the validity of this opinion, as a matter of interpreting the Act, we 
note here that no dynamic constitutional restriction upon the power of the Congress so to extend the 
Act occurred to the judges to cause them to deter or qualify their opinion. 
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with respect to arbitration agreements which might constitutionally have been brought 
under the Act when they come into a federal court from a jurisdiction having an 
arbitration statute of similar pattern to the United States Act, whereby, as respects the 
agreement, the traditional rules of revocability and non-enforceability would be 
nullified or when the disputed claim covered by the agreement is a cause arising 
under a law of the United States.35 
Of course the "nub of the policy" of the Erie case returns for consideration in this 
connection in diversity cases. Grant that irrevocability and other enforceability be 
accorded the given arbitration agreement by state law, must the federal court, other- 
wise having jurisdiction to hear and decide the controversy, as a diversity case, 
accord the same consequences to the agreement as would the state court in order to 
meet the policy of the Erie case? Grant, on the other hand, that common law rev- 
ocability and non-enforceability would be accorded by the state court, must the 
federal court, it being a diversity case, follow suit to meet the requirements of the 
Erie case? 
We have been unable, as was Judge Cardozo in Berkovitz v. Arbib and Houl- 
berg, and as was Judge Frank in Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading 
Co., to find any substance for common law revocabTlity and non-enforceability. 
They thwart the agreement of the parties for no substantial reason. We doubt that 
the policy intended by the Erie case is expected to control the determination of 
the issue whether a hearing and trial in the federal court shall be had or whether 
arbitration shall be had in lieu thereof. We concede, however, that it is somewhat 
easier, perhaps, to find, notwithstanding the policy of the Erie case, no constitutional 
limitation of the power of the Congress to extend the coverage of the Act, as we 
have suggested, than to find the freedom of the federal court in a diversity case to 
determine whether or not to hear and decide a controversy when it is confronted 
with the parties' arbitration agreement outside the Act. 
Of course, it remains to concede that it may well be deemed beyond the com- 
petence and call-of-duty of the federal courts to accord the motion remedies of the 
Act to arbitration agreements which do not qualify thereunder. The party in Zip 
Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co. moved for stay under Section 3; it was denied because 
the court found that the Act did not apply to the arbitration agreement since it was 
not in a "maritime transaction" nor in a contract involving "commerce." It may be 
admitted that the court was not called upon to decide more in view of the party's 
invocation of the statutory remedy. But if the stay had been sought by answer as at 
common law in reliance on the arbitration agreement, or if the more formal specific 
performance were sought in plenary suit, or if court appointment of arbitrators 
were sought in aid of the enforcement of the agreement, it is not clear how these 
enforcements could plausibly be denied by any reliance placed upon the ancient tra- 
36 As to how this problem may present itself to the courts of the United States, see Zip Mfg. Co. v. 
Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 184 (D. Del. 1930), (overruled on grounds to be considered in the next topic, see 
infra note 36), and Voutrey v. General Baking Co., 39 F. Supp. 974 (E. D. Pa. I941). Compare, Judge 
Hough in Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 5 F.2d i28 (2d Cir. I924). 
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dition that arbitration agreements are against "public policy" as attempts to oust the 
courts of their jurisdiction. 
III 
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3 IS LIMITED TO ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS COVERING 
CONTROVERSIES ARISING OUT OF "MARITIME TRANSACTIONS" OR CONTRACTS 
EVIDENCING A TRANSACTION IN "COMMERCE" 
Section 3, with its catch line, reads as follows: 
STAY OF PROCEEDINGS WHERE ISSUE THEREIN REFERABLE 
TO ARBITRATION 
?3. If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States 
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, 
the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in 
such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on 
application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been 
had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay 
is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration. 
As previously indicated, there has been some diversity of view on the question 
whether the remedy of stay of trial provided in Section 3 is limited to arbitration 
agreements covering controversies arising out of "maritime transactions" or contracts 
involving "commerce," or extends to arbitration agreements covering controversies 
arising out of other and different "transactions" or contracts, which may become 
the subject of action in the federal courts. Judicial consideration of this question 
thus far has related to written arbitration provisions to settle by arbitration con- 
troversies arising in the future from the contract in which the provision was con- 
tained-not as to agreements of submission of existing controversies. More precisely 
stated, perhaps, the diversity to be reviewed relates to whether or not the scope 
of Section 3 is limited to arbitration provisions qualifying under Section 2. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was the first court of appeals to 
decide this question. It ruled in Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co.36 that 
Section 3 is not so limited. Part of Judge Goodrich's opinion for the court has been 
quoted above in the last preceding topic. Notwithstanding some repetition, his 
opinion on this point will be set forth here in full:37 
The second question is whether ?3 of the Act, which provides for a stay of proceedings 
in a lawsuit until arbitration proceedings have been had, is limited to the contracts and 
transactions described in ?2. This is the question on which the parties have expended 
the bulk of their ammunition .... 
The title of the Act suggests, though of course it does not compel, the conclusion that 
the provisions of the statute are applicable to three kinds of things: (i) Contracts, (2) 
36 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943), reversing on this point the decision of the district court, 49 F. Supp. 
843 (M. D. Pa. 1943); also overruling Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 184 (D. Del. 1930). 
37 I38 F.2d at 4-6 (italics supplied). 
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maritime transactions and (3) commerce, interstate and foreign. The first section defines 
maritime transactions and commerce. Then the second section proceeds to lay down 
a rule of substantive law regarding the validity of an agreement for arbitration in case 
of any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce. 
Congress was here making a rule concerning subject matter within its own constitutional 
legislative authority. It was not seeking to confer validity to arbitration agreements gen- 
erally, a matter outside the scope of federal powers. Instead it picked out two important 
classes of transactions within the federal legislative domain and declared the effect of 
arbitration clauses in agreements concerned therewith. 
Then in ?3 the statute deals with the conduct of suits in federal courts, again a sub- 
ject matter of congressional power. The language becomes general: "any suit or proceed- 
ing," upon "any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such 
arbitration" are the words. Congress is not limited, in legislating as to law suits in 
federal courts, to those suits involving matters where the substantive rights of the parties 
may be controlled by federal legislation. The generality of the language used in the 
statute does not suggest any self-imposed limitation. Nor do we think that the "con- 
gressional approval of arbitration," should be so limited by implication, by a grudging 
type of construction carried down from the days of judicial hostility to all arbitration 
agreements. We think it clear that the provisions of ?3 are not to be limited to the 
specific instances dealt with in ?2. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit likewise ruled in Agostini Bros. 
Bldg. Corp. v. United States38 that Section 3 is not limited to arbitration agreements 
in transactions or contracts designated in Section 2. Judge Parker's opinion on this 
point is of the same general tenor as that of Judge Goodrich in the Donahue case, 
as follows:39 
38 
142 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. I944). 
39 Id. at 855-856 (italics supplied). Both Judge Goodrich and Judge Parker cited an avowed 
dictum by Judge Learned Hand in Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp., 70 
F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1934) as tending to support their views. Judge Hand had commented in that case 
that " section 2 defines those contracts which it makes 'valid, irrevocable and enforceable,' and no doubt 
such alone are within section 4. Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, 62 F.2d I004 
(CCA 2). But it does not follow that section 3 is so circumscribed; the language is: 'If any suit . . . 
be brought . . . upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement . . . for such arbitration.' 
'Such arbitration' may very well refer back to 'any issue referable to arbitration' and not to section 2. 
The change in language from section 5 of the New York Arbitration Act, from which, in general, 
section 3 of the federal act was copied, was plainly deliberate. In the New York act the clause had 
read, 'under a contract . . . described in section two' and' section 2 of that act was the analogue of 
section 2 of the federal act (9 USCA ?2). 'Such arbitration' was very awkward as an equivalent for all 
that is comprised in section 2 of the federal act, and suggests a broader intent. It is not necessary, 
however, to decide the point here, because the contract 'involved commerce' as defined by section i." 
70 F.2d at 298, 299. 
Many other instances of frailties of draftsmanship appear in the Act; but we have difficulty in 
finding basis in the Act or in its legislative history for Judge Hand's thought that the change of 
language in Section 3 of the Act from Section 5 of the New York ,Act was deliberate and for the 
purpose indicated by him; we expect that it was more fortuitous than otherwise. And, at all events, 
Judge Hand's view seems unduly to identify the independence of Section 3 and disassociate it from 
the rest of the Act (including Section 2), of which it is only a part. 
In accord with the foregoing rulings by Judges Goodrich and Parker (outside their circuits) are: 
Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Screw Machine Products Co., 73 F. Supp. 578 (E. D. Wis. 1947); Wilson 
& Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F. Supp. 364 (D. Neb. I948). 
Expressions of approval, in addition to Judge Learned Hand's, supra, also appear in In re Pahlberg 
Petition, 131 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1942); and Lewittes & Son v. International Union United Furniture 
Workers, 95 F. Supp. 851 (S. D. N. Y. I951). 
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We see no reason to thus limit the plain meaning of the general language used in 
section 3. Congress gave its approval to the principle of arbitration by the enactment of 
the statute (Shanferoke v. Westchester Service Corp., supra, 293 U. S. 449, 453, 55 S. Ct. 
3I3, 79 L. Ed. 583); and it manifestly intended to exercise its full power in furtherance 
of the principle. The statute was entitled "An Act to make valid and enforceable writ- 
ten provisions and agreements for arbitration of disputes arising out of contracts, mari- 
time transactions, or commerce among the States or Territories or with foreign nations," 
43 Stat. 883, 9 U. S. C. A. ?I-I5. As introduced into Congress, section 2 of the Act 
provided for the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements "in any contract or 
maritime transaction or transaction involving commerce." The Senate Committee struck 
the word "contract" from the section and rewrote the language in its present form, so 
as to cover only maritime transactions and transactions involving interstate and foreign 
commerce. Senate Report No. 536, 68th Congress; Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., D. C., 
44 F.2d 184. This was evidently done because it was realized that Congress had no 
power to legislate with respect to the validity of contracts generally but only as to the 
validity of those which related to matters subject to its control. 
There could be no question, however, as to the power of Congress to exercise the full 
power attempted by section 3 of the act. Its power to regulate the procedure of the lower 
federal courts, and even to limit their jurisdiction was well established; and there was no 
reason why it should not provide in furtherance of the arbitration, which it was seeking to 
promote, that, where arbitration was provided for by a contract in suit, proceedings in 
such courts should be stayed until arbitration should be had pursuant to the contract. 
The power exercised by Congress in section 3 is in no respect dependent upon that 
exercised in section 2; there was no ambiguity in the language employed in section 3; and 
there was no reason that we can apprehend why the language used should not be given its 
normal and ordinary meaning or why it should be held limited by the provisions of sec- 
tion 2 where Congress was exercising a limited power. If it had been intended that the 
stay provided by section 3 should be limited to the cases where Congress had legislated 
with respect to the validity of contracts, it would have been easy enough to say so. 
The foregoing rulings by the Courts of Appeals of the Third and Fourth Circuits 
are regarded as of doubtful validity. We believe that the Act invites the reading 
of its sections into more correlated relationship. While the proponents of arbitra- 
tion-even those who may not come within Judge Frank's "more enthusiastic" 
sponsors of the process-will appreciate the "new orientation" as championed by 
Judges Goodrich and Parker, in their opinions in the foregoing cases, their precise 
conclusions on the above issue, however, are difficult to support. 
This is true for several reasons. We already have made the point that in so far 
as those rulings are predicated upon an assumption that the Congress had broader 
or different power to grant the stay remedy of Section 3 than the other enforcement 
remedies of Sections 4 and 5, they are weakened because the assumption is ill 
founded. Again, the language of Section 3 is no more inclusive of what arbitration 
agreements are embraced therein than the language of Sections 4 or 5; Sections 4 
and 5 standing by themselves do not purport any more than Section 3 to be tied to 
controversies arising out of "maritime transactions" or contracts evidencing a trans- 
action involving "commerce." This also is true of Section 8. If by its language 
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Section 3 were plausibly extended, the language of Sections 4 and 5 might be likewise 
extended. Indeed, Judge Parker appears to have accepted this view in his sub- 
sequent opinion in International Union United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hard- 
wood Flooring Co.40 After noting from the legislative history of the Act that "any 
contract" was eliminated by the Senate Committee from the original Section 2, he 
went on to point out that no change had been made limiting in any respect the 
original language of Sections 3, 4, or the succeeding sections of the Act. Indeed, he 
concluded that his holding in Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, to the 
effect that Section 3 should not be interpreted as limited by the provisions of Section 
2, would be equally applicable to Sections 4 and 5. "The reasoning of that decision," 
he said, "would apply equally to section 4 and the succeeding sections." We under- 
stand him to mean in this connection that in so far as generality of language is con- 
cerned the language of Section 3 is no more comprehensive than that of Sections 4 
and 5.41 The courts have been nearly in accord, in so far as they have passed upon 
the precise issue, that the enforcement remedies of Sections 4 and 5 are limited to 
arbitration agreements in "maritime transactions" or in contracts involving "com- 
merce" as contemplated in Section 2.42 
It will be noted that as this thesis of generality of language (i.e., not being ex- 
pressly tied up to "maritime transactions," "commerce," or Section 2) is extended 
from Section 3 to Sections 4, 5, and 8 there will be little, if any, use for Sections i 
and 2. Quite clearly those sections were to have a more substantial role in the Act. j 
We have pointed out that Section 2 contains the statement of objective of the 
Act, namely, to render designated arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable and 
enforceable" and that the remedies of Sections 3, 4, and 5 are precisely tailored to 
accomplish, each its part, of that objective by overcoming the precise instances in 
which common law revocability and non-enforceability are effective. While the stay 
remedy of Section 3 is formally more negative than the remedies of Sections 4 or 5, 
it serves as a positive injunction against one instance of common law revocability in 
furtherance of the objective broadly set down in Section 2.43 In short, the stay 
40 I68 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. I948). 
41We do not gather that Judge Parker sought to impugn his decision in the Agostini Bros. Bldg. 
Corp. case; nor that he necessarily intended to indicate that he was ready to rule that Sections 4 and 5 
(as well as Section 3) cover arbitration agreements outside those identified in Section 2. 
In The Gerald A. Fagan, 49 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. I93I) views similar to those last quoted from 
Judge Parker had been advanced by Judge Manton with respect to Section 8. In a proceeding in 
admiralty involving Section 8 it was indicated that application for an order to arbitrate might well be 
granted although the arbitration provision was not in a "maritime transaction" or "commerce" provided 
it covered a cause justiciable in admiralty. The generality of the language (i.e., freedom from tie-up 
with "maritime transaction" and "commerce") of both Sections 4 and 8 were cited in this connection, 
as follows: "From an examination of this act, it will appear that the terms 'maritime transactions' and 
'commerce' defined in section I are found again in section 2.... Sections 4 and 8 ... which permit 
applications to the court, make no reference to these terms." Id. at 2I7. 
4 Supra note 12. 
43There has been some tendency to differentiate a stay order under Section 3 from an order to 
proceed under Section 4. The one, it is suggested, is "merely a stay order of a kind long familiar in com- 
mon law, equity and admiralty actions," while the latter order "is one for specific performance." Judge 
Frank emphasized this distinction in the course of his learned opinion in Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. 
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remedy of Section 3 is as much subservient to and correlated with the objectives of 
Section 2 as are the remedies of Sections 4 and 5. The three Sections constitute the 
group of enforcement remedies provided to effectuate the purpose of the Act as set 
out in Section 2 and only as the remedies of all of those sections are honored is the 
purpose of Section 2 best assured. It is clear that the Senate Committee understood 
the correlation of these remedies and that they were so correlated fully to effectuate 
the declared objective of Section 2 with respect to arbitration agreements therein 
Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 987 (2d Cir. I942). He elaborated the point as follows: "There 
it is a well recognized distinction between such a stay and specific performance: The first merely arrests 
further action by the court itself in the suit until something outside the suit has happened; but the 
court does not order that it shall be done. The second, through the exercise of discretionary equity 
powers, affirmatively orders that some one do (or refrain from doing) some act outside the suit." 
Judge Frank also felt that "the same equitable considerations" are not applicable to an application for 
a stay order under Section 3 as to an application for an order to proceed under Section 4. 
We feel that these distinctions go more to form than to substance and that the stay order is as 
injunctional (specific performance) in accomplishing one instance of equitable relief as the order to 
proceed in accomplishing another instance of equitable relief. The stay order means something to the 
plaintiff, namely, that he shall "refrain from doing"; it is "not merely" an order upon the court that 
it "arrest further action" nor in rem, as it were, against "the action." The facility of accomplishing 
and verifying compliance with the order of stay under Section 3 is, of course, more immediate and 
different, by reason of the court's control over its docket and law-making functions, from the situation 
in the case of an order to proceed under Section 4. But such differences do not seem controlling, or 
very significant, in identifying their correlative services under the Act. 
And while the "equitable considerations" which should be weighed by the court on an application for 
a stay under Section 3 may not be identical with those attending an application for an order to proceed 
under Section 4, they are likely to be very similar in the two cases. Issues (I) as to "the making" of 
the arbitration agreement, (2) as to its coverage of the controversy in question, (3) as to the qualifica- 
tions of the arbitration agreement under the Act, (4) as to "the default" of the party who presents the 
application, (5) as to the readiness and willingness of the applicant to arbitrate, (6) as to the default 
of the adverse party under the arbitration agreement, (7) as to the authority and duty of the district 
court to hear and decide these preliminary matters, with references to a jury of certain matters prescribed 
in the Act, (8) as to the course of conduct of the petitioning party which, as a matter of "equitable con- 
sideration" by the court, may or may not be deemed to constitute "waiver," "abandonment," or undue 
"playing fast and loose" with litigation and arbitration, and (9) the authority and duty of the court 
to retain jurisdiction of the cause for granting such other and additional remedy as may be provided 
by the Act or to which the party may be entitled under law-all seem pertinent alike upon an applica- 
tion for one order as for the other. As the party qualifies his claim for arbitration under the one 
Section so will he, in most substantial matters, qualify it under the other. The form, futurity, or per- 
sonalization of the order is of insubstantial consequence to the parties and the court. 
It may be noted in passing that the courts, in cases dealing with appealability, have identified both 
classes of orders as injunctional. A stay order "is in effect an injunction" and appealable as such. 
Hudson Lumber Co. v. U. S. Plywood Corp., }8I F.2d 929 (9th Cir. I950). The Supreme Court has 
declared that "the special defense setting up the arbitration agreement is an equitable defense or crossbill 
within the meaning of ?274b (Judicial Code); and that the motion for a stay is an application for an 
interlocutory injunction based on the special defense"; therefore the appeal to the court of appeals from 
the order of the district court denying the application for stay was proper under ?I29 of the Judicial Code. Shanferoke Coal & Supply Co. v. Westchester Service Corp., 293 U. S. 449, 452 (1935). See also 
Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. I947). 
Compare the appealability in admiralty of orders to proceed and of stay as ruled in Hildegard 
Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg American Line, 294 U. S. 454 (I935). And consult, In re Pahlberg 
Petition, 13I F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1942); The Sydfold, 25 F. Supp. 662 (S. D. N. Y. I938). Although 
beyond the scope of this article, we are prompted to reserve for future criticism the Supreme Court's 
identification of injunctional orders under either Section 3, 4, or 8, even for appealability questions, as 
"not to be distinguished from an order postponing trial of an action at lawU to await the report of an 
auditor." 294 U. S. at 456, 457 (italics supplied). Consult generally in this connection, Hyman v. 
Pottberg's exrs., IOI F.2d 262 (2d Cir. I939); Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, Inc., 62 
F.2d I004 (2d Cir. 1933). 
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designated. There is no indication in the legislative history of the Act that any one 
of these remedies (Section 3, for example) was expected to service arbitration agree- 
ments outside Section 2. 
Said the report of the Senate Committee: 
The purpose of the bill is clearly set forth in Section 2, which, as proposed to be 
amended, reads as follows: [quoting the section as enacted]" (italics supplied). 
The report continues with respect to what arbitration agreements the bill (which 
became the Act) applies and the reason for the remedies therein provided as follows: 
The "maritime transactions or contracts," to which the bill will apply are defined 
in section I. Likewise, the definition of "commerce" in the same section, shows to what 
contracts in interstate or foreign commerce the bill will be applicable. 
It is not contended that agreements to arbitrate have no validity whatever. A party 
may be liable in an action for damages for the breach of an executory agreement to 
arbitrate; or, if the agreement has been executed according to its terms and an award 
made, the appropriate action may be brought at law or in equity to enforce the award. 
Both maritime transactions and contracts involving interstate commerce are at least 
valid to this extent. 
But it is very old law that the performance of a written agreement to arbitrate would 
not be enforced in equity, and that if an action at law were brought on the contract con- 
taining the agreement to arbitrate, such agreement could not be pleaded in bar of the 
action; nor would such an agreement be ground for a stay of proceedings until arbitration 
was had. Further, the agreement was subject to revocation by either of the parties 
at any time before the award. With this as the state of the law, such agreements were in 
large part inefectual, and the party aggrieved by the refusal of the other party to carry 
out the arbitration agreement was without adequate remedy .... 
The bill, while relating to maritime transactions and to contracts in interstate and 
foreign commerce, follows the lines of the New York arbitration law enacted in 1920, 
amended in 1921, and sustained by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the matter of the Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., rendered February I8, 
1924 (italics supplied). 
It remains to note the frustration, if not futility, in furthering the principle of 
arbitration under the Act, which may attend arbitration agreements which, by the 
above rulings, are enforced by stay of trial under Section 3 but are beyond the reach 
of the remedies of Sections 4 and 5. This consideration also tends, in our opinion, 
to confirm that the Act was not planned for such consequences. It re-emphasizes 
the expected correlation and team work of the remedies of the three Sections. 
By hypothesis, the arbitration agreement is outside the statute, except Section 3; 
stay of trial is granted under Section 3. Unless the federal courts will forsake in full 
common law revocability and non-enforceability of such arbitration agreements the 
effect of the stay can readily be nullified by the plaintiff. Notice of revocation at any 
time before award can block any further progress toward an arbitral settlement of 
the controversy under the Act. If the federal courts will deny the validity of revoca- 
bility (by notice and by action) still the plaintiff may refuse to cooperate in ap- 
pointing the arbitral board and otherwise refuse to perform the arbitration agree- 
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ment. If the federal courts will repudiate common law non-enforceability of such 
agreements, the defendant, having his stay, could seek a decree of specific per- 
formance by plenary suit. It would be necessary to determine by the decree how the 
arbitration should proceed, whether in accord with the Act, or otherwise. If the 
federal courts will not accord such enforcement, it may occur to the defendant, if he 
is still ready and willing to arbitrate, to seek the further enforcement in a state court 
of a state having an arbitration statute of like general pattern as the United States 
Act. He will be confronted with the problems of bringing the recalcitrant party 
within the jurisdiction of that court and qualifying the arbitration agreement under 
that statute. He might or might not succeed according to the situation of each case. 
The uncertainties attending the accomplishment of this endeavor can only be 
imagined, although it may be speculated that the mere fact that the federal court 
has jurisdiction of the case and that it is pending in that court with the outstanding 
stay of trial should not bar the defendant from invoking the statutory remedies of 
the state statute in the state court.44 If the federal courts will not fully repudiate 
common law revocability and non-enforceability and if the defendant cannot bring 
the plaintiff under a state statute like that of New York, or cannot qualify his 
arbitration agreement thereunder for its enforcement remedies, his stay in the 
federal court is nearly futile in progressing the cause to arbitration. 
In the meantime the plaintiff who is subject to the stay in the federal court may 
find it smart for his purposes voluntarily to dismiss his action in the federal court, 
thereby relieving himself from the stay, and start his litigation anew in a state court 
where the rules of common law revocability and non-enforceability are in full effect.45 
Of course, the defendant may be successful in returning the case to a federal court, 
and so on-all of which will bring the parties no further along toward an arbitral 
settlement of their controversy. 
In view of these considerations-namely-the interrelation, interdependence, and 
group function of the remedies of Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the Act fully to accomplish 
the purpose of the Act as set out in Section 2, the identification by the Senate Com- 
mittee of Section 2 as bearing the purpose of the whole Act as set forth above, and 
the uncertainties and frustration which will attend the accomplishment of any 
arbitral settlement if the remedies of Sections 4 and 5 are unavailable-it seems most 
reasonable to conclude that Section 2 is best construed as determining what arbitra- 
tion agreements come under Section 3 as well as under the other sections of the 
Act. 
'4 The views and ruling of the Supreme Court in Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. I09 
(1924), might facilitate favorable inference to this conclusion. But see, Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross 
Line, 5 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1924). 
"6 Concerning these possibilities, see Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson & Co., 86 F. Supp. 968 (D. Neb. I949), in which the plaintiff did just what was suggested. And for the end of the arbitration 
agreement and arbitration in that case, see 183 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. I950). 
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IV 
CONCERNING ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 
The first section of the Act excepts or excludes certain "contracts of employ- 
ment." The Section and its catch line (to reprint them a second time for possible 
convenience of reference) read as follows: 
"MARITIME TRANSACTIONS" AND "COMMERCE" DEFINED; EXCEPTIONS 
TO OPERATION OF TITLE 
?i. "Maritime transactions," as herein defined, means charter parties, bills of lading 
of water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to 
vessels, collisions, or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of contro- 
versy, would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction; "commerce," as herein defined, 
means commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of 
the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and 
another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the 
District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein con- 
tained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other 
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce (italics supplied). 
Reports by the Congressional Committees are silent as to the reason for this 
exclusion. 
Whatever may have been the controlling reason for it at the time the Act was 
enacted in I925, it is clear that arbitration has gained stature and a significant role 
since then in the administration of collective bargaining agreements. In approaching 
the scope and operation of this exception or exclusion we adopt the attitude as first 
voiced by District Judge McGranery in United Office & Professional Workers, C.I.O., 
v. Monumental Life Ins. Co.46 
Under the national policy favoring the enforcement of collective labor agreements 
through judicial and quasi-judicial processes rather than through the use of economic 
force, Labor Management Relations Act 1947, Section I(b), it is well to interpret the 
Arbitration Act in such a manner as to encourage the effectuation of that policy, and to 
avoid "a grudging type of construction carried down from the days of judicial hostility to 
all arbitration agreements." 
Judicial decisions involving this exclusion line up in three diversities and contra- 
dictions :47 
46 88 F. Supp. 602, 607 (E.D. Pa. 1950); also by District Judge Weinfeld in Lewittes & Sons v. 
United Furniture Workers, 95 F. Supp. 851 (S. D. N. Y. 1951). 
47 Some of the state arbitration statutes of like pattern as that of the United States Act have comparable 
exclusions as follows: California, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ?1280 (1941) "provided, however, the pro- 
visions of this title shall not apply to contracts pertaining to labor"; Louisiana, REV. STAT. ?9:4216 
(1950) "Nothing in this chapter shall apply to contracts of employment of labor . . ."; New Hampshire, 
REV. LAWS, c. 415 ?I, p. 1724 (1941) "provided, however, that the provisions of this act shall not 
apply to collective contracts between employers and employees, or between employers and associations 
of employees in respect to terms or conditions of employment"; Ohio, GEN. CODE ANN. ?I2148-I (I938) 
"The provisions of this act shall not apply to (a) collective or individual contracts between employers 
and ernployees in respect to terms or conditions of employment . . ."; Oregon, COMP. LAWS ANN. ??II-60I 
(1940) excepts controversies which ". . . respect . . . the terms or conditions of employment under 
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(I) The exclusion is from the whole Act, including Section 3. 
(2) It does not apply to Section 3 because it is only an exception from the 
definition of "commerce" in Section i. 
(3) Arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements are not within 
the exclusicn because the latter are not "contracts of employment" within the meaning 
of that term as used therein. 
The status of a written provision for arbitration in a collective bargaining 
agreement under the Act appears to have come to judgment in a court of 
appeals for the first time in Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co. in the third 
circuit.48 The decision has been reviewed above as it determined the scope of 
collective contracts between employers and employees or between employers and associations of em- 
ployees . . ."; Pennsylvania, 5 PA. STAT. ANN. I16 (1930) ". . . except a contract for personal serv- 
ices . . ."; Rhode Island, GEN. LAWS c. 475 ?I (1-938) "provided, however, that the provisions of this 
chapter shall not apply to collective contracts between employers and employees, or between employers 
and associations of employees, in respect to terms or conditions of employment"; Wis. STAT. 298.01 
(1949) "the provisions of this chapter shall not apply to contracts between employers and employees, 
or between employers and associations of employees, except as provided in Section III.10 of the statutes" 
(Section I I.Io refers to arbitrations of labor disputes under the sponsorship of the state employment 
relations board). 
There are no such exclusions in the statutes of the other states of this group, namely, Connecticut, 
GEN. STAT. ?8I5I et seq. (1949); Hawaii, Rev. Laws, c. I65 ?870I et seq. (I945); Massachusetts, Gen. 
Laws, c. 251, ?I et seq. (1948); New Jersey, STAT. ANN. ?2:40 (I939). 
The New York Statute of 1920 was amended in 1937 to read as follows: "A provision in a written 
contract between a labor organization, as defined in subdivision five of section seven hundred one of 
the labor law, and employer or employers or association or group of employers to settle by arbitration a 
controversy or controversies thereafter arising between the parties to the contract including but not 
restricted to controversies dealing with rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other terms 
and conditions of employment of any employee or employees of such employer or employers shall 
likewise be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract." 
Concerning the situation in Washington, see Sturges and Sturges, Some Confusing Matters Relating 
to Arbitration in Washington, 25 WASH. L. REV. I6 (I950). 
48 According to the report of the case in the District Court (Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 
49 F. Supp. 843 (M.D. Pa. 1943)) Donahue brought an action on behalf of himself and other employees 
of the defendant employer to recover overtime claimed to be due them under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act. The defendant applied for a stay of trial relying upon Section 3 of the Act. The District Judge 
reported that the arbitration provision was in "the contract of employment entered into between the 
defendant and the plaintiff-employees." The application for stay was denied on the ground that, to quote 
the court, "the employment contract here under consideration does not evidence a 'transaction involving 
commerce' within the meaning of Section 2. Therefore, if Section 3 is limited in its operation to those 
arbitration agreements which are defined in Section 2, the defendant's application must be denied." 
The judge held that Section 3 was so limited and denied the stay. This ruling was reversed in the court 
of appeals on the opinion of Judge Goodrich as reported above. The report of the case in the court 
of appeals does not disclose any more details as to the agreement containing the arbitration provision. 
In short, the attention of the court of appeals and Judge Goodrich's opinion seem to have been directed 
rather exclusively to the issue as to the scope and operation of Section 3 and without regard for the 
limitation or exception of Section i relating to "contracts of employment." Following the denial of the 
stay in the district court the company (employer) applied to the district court for an order to arbitrate 
relying upon Section 4. The application was denied on the same ground that the stay had been denied. 
Application of Susquehanna Collieries Co., 49 F. Supp. 845 (M. D. Pa. I943). In the report of this 
case it appears that the arbitration provision was contained in a collective bargaining agreement entered 
into by the United Mine Workers and the Anthracite Operators. The plaintiff employees were union 
members and the defendant employer was a member of the Operators. The district judge observed 
in this second case that "The agreement is limited to the matter of wages and conditions of employment 
in the anthracite coal fields of Pennsylvania," and concluded: "There is nothing in the contract here 
under consideration to indicate that the employment of the plaintiff and those whom plaintiff represents 
involves 'commerce.' " Id. at 845, 846. 
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Section 3 of the Act. It should be noted, however, that the court of appeals did not 
give any express consideration to the effect of the foregoing exclusion of Section i. 
And it does not appear in the report of the case that any point was raised as to 
whether or not the contract containing the arbitration provision was anything other 
than a "contract of employment." 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with a similar case in 
Gatlif, Coal Co. v. Cox49 within the year following the decision in the Donahue 
case. Plaintiff-employee sued defendant-employer to recover wages alleged to be 
due under the Fair Labor Standards Act and relying upon a collective bargaining 
agreernent between the United Mine Workers and the Appalachian Coal Operators. 
Plaintiff was a union member and the defendant was a member of the Operators. 
The suit was initiated in a court of the state of Kentucky. The defendant removed it 
to the District Court for the District of Kentucky and applied for stay of trial of 
the suit under Section 3. The application was denied in the district court and 
the order was affirmed by the court of appeals.50 
The error assigned against the order of the district court denying the stay was 
based upon the limitation in Section i. It was contended, in effect, that this pro- 
vision of Section I did not rule the arbitration provision out of the operation of 
Section 3. The court of appeals appears to have entertained no doubt that the 
collective agreement containing the arbitration provision was a "contract of employ- 
ment." In sustaining the order denying the stay, Judge Hamilton stated the 
position of the court of appeals as follows:51 
It is clear that the exception here in question was deliberately worded by the Congress to 
exclude from the National Arbitration Act all contracts of employment of workers en- 
gaged in interstate commerce. Section 2 of the Act makes valid and irrevocable all 
arbitration agreements in writing to submit to arbitration future controversies arising 
out of the contract of which the arbitration agreement was a part. It would be senseless 
to say that the exclusion from the Act covers the validity of the contract, but excludes the 
stay provision of Section 3. The reason for the exclusion is applicable to the entire Act. 
The language of the exclusion "herein contained" is found in the first section of the Act. 
This section is made up entirely of definitions and exceptions to the operation of the title. 
Ju(ige Hamilton further indicated that the court of appeals and Judge Goodrich 
49 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944). 50 The court of appeals gave some attention to the law of Kentucky ruling common law revocability 
of arbitration provisions. The court observed in this connection: "The rule prevails in Kentucky that 
parties may not by contract deprive themselves of the right to resort to courts for the settlement of their 
controversies." Id. at 881. 
It went further to say: "It is our duty to expound, not to make the law of the State." Ibid. 
It seems clear that the law of Kentucky relating to the revocability or non-enforceability of arbitra- 
tion agreements was not pertinent after the removal of the case to the district court. And the court of 
appeals also concluded as much in another part of its opinion in this case (in close juxtaposition with 
the foregoing part of its opinion), as follows: "An agreement that all differences arising under a con- 
tract shall be submitted to arbitration relates to the law of remedies and the law that governs remedies 
is the law of the forum. Such a contract, whatever form it may assume, affects in its operation the 
remedy alone. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co. 264 U. S. Io9, II9, 44 S. Ct. 274, 68 L. Ed. 582." 
Ibid. 
1 Id. at 882. See also, Delaware & Hudson R. Corp. v. Williams, 129 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1942). 
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in the Donahue case may have overlooked the exclusion of Section i, or, "if there 
be implicit in the court's decision a conclusion that the Arbitration Act is applicable 
to employment contracts, we find ourselves in disagreement."52 
Thus far we have no judicial determination of the question whether an arbitra- 
tion provision in a collective bargaining agreement is in a "contract of employment" 
as the term is used in the limitation of Section i. We do have Judge Goodrich's 
opinion in the Donahue case that Section 3 is not limited to arbitration provisions 
in transactions or contracts designated in Section 2, and that ruling was made with 
respect to an arbitration provision in what both the district judge and Judge Good- 
rich recognized as a "contract of employment." In the Gatlif Coal Co. case the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit expressly recognized the contract containing 
the arbitration provision as a "contract of employment" and ruled that the arbitra- 
tion therein was excepted from the whole Act, including, of course, Section 3. 
The general question came back to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 
1945 in Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co.53 
Employees sued their employer in the district court on like cause as in the 
Donahue case and the employer applied for an order to stay the trial and also for an 
order to arbitrate. The defendant based its applications upon arbitration provisions 
in a collective bargaining agreement between the United Mine Workers and the 
Anthracite Operators and upon Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. The District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania54 (being within the third circuit) granted the 
stay under Section 3 on the ground that the decision in the Donahue case was con- 
trolling. It denied the application under Section 4 for the order to arbitrate on the 
ground that the power of the court "to grant the affirmative relief requested is limited 
to those cases over which the court would have jurisdiction under the judicial code 
at law, in equity, or in admiralty. This is not such a case ... ."5 The court of 
appeals modified and affirmed as modified the order of stay and affirmed the order 
denying the application to arbitrate. Judge Goodrich gave the majority ruling; 
Judge McAllister dissented. Said Judge Goodrich:56 
We have already answered that question [as to the scope of Section 3] in Donahue v. 
Susquehanna Collieries Co. 1943, I38 F.2d 3, I49 ALR 271, and the District Court fol- 
lowed that decision in making the order which it did. Our analysis of the problem in- 
volved has found support in a decision by the Fourth Circuit in Agostini Bros. Bldg. 
Corp. v. United States, I944, I42 F.2d 854. The Sixth Circuit has doubted the correctness 
of our result. Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, I944, I42 F.2d 876. 
With further reference to the decision in the Gatliff Coal Co. case holding that 
52 Ibid. 
53 i5 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. I945)., cert. denied, 327 U. S. 777 (1946). 
64 54 F. Supp. 953 (M. D. Pa. I944). 
55 Id. at 958. 
56 151 F.2d 3II, 320. In a footnote Judge Goodrich made mention of the fact that the decision 
in the Agostini Bros. case came down on June 2, 1944, and in the Gatlifi case on June I, I944. "Ob- 
viously,' he said, "neither had the benefit of the consideration of the question by the other." 
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the limitation in Section i ruled the whole Act, including Section 3, Judge Goodrich 
observed as follows:57 
We think the criticism made by our colleagues in the Sixth Circuit is not convincing. 
While it is true that in defining commerce in Section i contracts of employment of speci- 
fied types of employees were excluded, it should be noted that this exclusion was only 
in the definition of commerce in that section. Section 3 of the statute does not use the 
term commerce. We do not think that the limitation in the definition in Section I should 
be applied as an over-all limitation elsewhere to the section where the defined term is 
not used. We, therefore, adhere to the Donahue decision and with increased confidence 
because of its emphatic approval by the Fourth Circuit in the case just cited. [Referring 
to the Agostini Bros. case, with opinion by Judge Parker.] 
Judge McAllister did not agree with Judge Goodrich on the limited scope given 
to the exclusion of employment contracts in Section i. He felt that the arbitration 
provision in the contract before the court was excepted from the whole Act, includ- 
ing Section 3. "I believe," he said, "that it is so excepted, because it is a contract of 
employment of a class of workers engaged in interstate commerce."58 
Referring to Section I, he observed:5 
The foregoing section is concerned with definitions of "maritime transactions," and 
"commerce," and with an enumeration of certain contracts of employment which are 
excepted from the application of the section or from the application of the entire Act.... 
In the prevailing opinion it is held that, in defining commerce in Section i, contracts of 
employment of specified types of employees were excluded, but that such exclusion was 
only in the definition of "commerce" in that section and that the limitation in the 
definition in Section I should not be applied as an over-all limitation where the defined 
term is not used. 
Viewing the problem from a somewhat different aspect, however, it seems to me that 
it should be said that the contract in question was one of a class, excepted from the opera- 
tion of the Act, by virtue of the statutory language used in Section I, wherein it is said 
that 
"nothing herein contained shall apply to the contracts of employment of ... any . . . 
class of workers engaged in ... interstate commerce." To construe this language as except- 
ing the designated classes of contracts of employment merely from the operation of Sec- 
tion i, rather than construing it as excepting such contracts from the operation of all of 
the provisions of the statute in question, appears to me untenable. The language of 
exclusion is found in the first section of the Act, which is composed entirely of definitions 
and exceptions. It is not used with any of the substantive provisions of the statute, which 
are set forth in the succeeding sections of the Act. Unless the excepting language applies 
to the entire statute, it seems to me rather meaningless. I am unable to read the phrase, 
"but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of . . . any . . . 
class of workers engaged in . . . interstate commerce," as a part of the definition of com- 
merce. Rather I feel that the language used in Section i relating to exceptions, is to be 
understood as referring to the entire statute, instead of merely to the first section. 
The general problem was soon to come before the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit and Judge Parker. It did so in I948 in International Union United 
5Id. at 320-321 (italics supplied). 58 Jd. at 321. 59 Ibid. 
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Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Company.00 The case was 
as follows: The employer sued the union of its employees for damages for alleged 
breach of their collective bargaining agreement by calling a strike contrary to the 
terms of the agreement. The union applied for a stay under Section 3 of the Act. 
The motion was denied in the district court. The ruling was based upon two 
grounds: (i) the arbitration provision did not embrace the controversy in issue-i.e., 
the company's claim for damages for breach of the no-strike provisions in the col- 
lective agreement, and (2) the Arbitration Act was not applicable because it was a 
controversy relating to the employment of workers engaged in interstate com- 
merce. The court of appeals sustained the district court on both grounds. 
Judge Parker was unable to go along with Judge Goodrich's ruling in the 
Watkins case; instead he sided with the Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit in the 
Gatlift Coal Co. case and with the foregoing dissenting opinion of Judge Mc- 
Allister in the Watkins case. Said Judge Parker:61 
It is perfectly clear, we think, that it was the intention of Congress to exclude contracts of 
employment from the operation of all of these provisions [of the Act]. Congress was 
steering clear of compulsory arbitration of labor disputes; and unless the excepting clause 
which we have italicized is applied to the entire Act, and not confined to the first section, 
section 4 would give the court power to force arbitration in any agreement providing for 
arbitration where there is jurisdiction because of diversity of citizenship or other reasons. 
Of course, if the excepting clause applies to section 4, it applies also to section 3; for the 
only alternative to applying it to the entire Act is to limit it to section i. The effect of 
limiting the excepting clause to section i would be merely to exclude employment con- 
tracts from maritime transactions and transactions in commerce as defined in the Act, so 
that these would not come within the arbitration agreements made valid and enforceable 
by section 2, but would leave them, if otherwise valid, to be enforced under the provisions 
of section 4, the provisions of which are not limited to maritime transactions or transactions 
in commerce. 
After referring to his opinion and ruling in the Agostini Bros. case as determining 
"that Section 3 of the Act should not be interpreted as limited by the provisions of 
Section 2," Judge Parker continued:62 
There is nothing in this, however, to justify the holding that the exclusion clause should 
not apply to the entire Act and remove employment contracts from the ambit of its 
provisions, as originally intended. 
He then turned to the Donahue and Watkins cases in the third circuit before 
Judge Goodrich. He observed:63 "We have given careful consideration" to those 
cases. And 
In the first of these cases [Donahue] no reference was made to the excepting clause con- 
tained in the statute and the sole question decided was whether the stay provided by 
paragraph [sic] 3 of the Act was limited to the contracts described in paragraph [sic] 
two. We thoroughly agree with what was said by the Third Circuit on this question and 
60 I68 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948). 61 Id. at 36-37. 62 Id. at 37. 63Id. at 38 (italics supplied). 
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we quoted at length from its opinion in our decision in the Agostini case, supra. The 
second case merely followed the first, citing our decision, with the additional statement 
that limitation in the first section should not be applied to the entire act. Judge Mc- 
Allister dissented from this conclusion, adopting the view followed in the Sixth Circuit 
[Gatlig case]. This is the first time that we have had occasion to consider the effect of 
the excepting clause, and with all respect to the able court whose decision we followed in 
holding the third section of the act not limited to the contracts covered by the second, 
we cannot but think that the excepting clause contained in the defining section of the 
act was intended to apply to the entire act and to except a contract such as that before us 
from all provisions of the act. 
So much for some of the diversity and contradiction in the law of the Act in the 
Courts of Appeals of the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits relating to the effect of 
the limitation of certain "contracts of employment" in Section i. So far we have no 
issue raised, nor determination made, as to whether arbitration provisions in col- 
lective bargaining agreements are in "contracts of employment" within the fore- 
going exclusion of Section i. 
In I950 District Judge McGranery in the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania (within the third circuit) and District Judge Weinfeld in the Dis- 
trict Court for the Southern District of New York in I95I ruled that collective bar- 
gaining agreements are not "contracts of employment" within the meaning of that 
term in Section i. 
In United Office & Professional Workers, C.I.O., v. Monumental Life Ins. Co.,64 
Judge McGranery recognized that the decisions in the Donahue and Watkins cases 
were controlling and granted a stay under Section 3 of a declaratory judgment pro- 
ceeding brought by the company (employer) against the union to determine whether 
or not the company was obligated by the terms of their collective bargaining agree- 
ment to discharge certain employees. 
The judge also granted the union's petition based on Section 4 for an order 
against the company to arbitrate. This order was entered over objection by the 
company that the only arbitration agreements enforceable under Section 4 are those 
covered in Section 2, that Section 2 covers provisions for arbitration in "maritime 
transactions" and in contracts involving "commerce," and that, since (relying upon 
Judge Goodrich's opinion in the Watkins case) the contracts of employment desig- 
nated in Section i are excepted from "commerce," the arbitration provision in the 
collective bargaining agreement in this case was not enforceable under Section 4. 
The judge concluded that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had not passed 
"directly on this issue" but suggested that Judge Goodrich might be influenced by a 
part of Judge Parker's opinion in the International Union United Furniture Workers 
v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co. case to hold that the remedy of Section 4 is 
not limited by the definition of "commerce" of Section I. Said Judge McGranery in 
this connection:65 
64 88 F. Supp. 602 (E. D. Pa. I950). 
65 Id. at 605-606. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not passed directly on this issue, although, 
as pointed out by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in International Union 
United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., supra, i68 F.2d at pages 
36-37, under the Third Circuit's interpretation of Section 3 in the Donahue and Watkins 
cases, supra, it is possible to interpret Section 4 as being unlimited by the commerce 
definition of Section i, with its excepting clause. 
By like combination of the cases, and relying again upon Judge Parker's opinion 
in the International Union United Furniture Workers case, the same conclusion 
might be reached with respect to Sections 5 and 8 of the Act. This would render 
the "commerce" definition of Section i, with its excepting clause, functus officio for 
all remedies for enforcement of arbitration provisions under the Act (Sections 3, 
4, and 5) regardless of Section 2. 
Judge McGranery concluded, however, that regardless of the views of the 
court of appeals in the foregoing cases as to the scope of the exclusion of the desig- 
nated "contracts of employment" in Section i (whether from the definition of 
"commerce" or from the entire Act), the determination of the issue was not re- 
quired in the case before the court. He held that the collective bargaining agree- 
ment between the union and the company was not a "contract of employment" and 
was, therefore, not within the limitation provision of Section i. The judge relied 
in this connection upon a portion of the opinion of Justice Jackson in 1. I. Case Co. 
v.. National Labor Relations Board66 wherein the Justice identified, for the purpose 
at hand, a collective bargaining agreement entered into between an employer and 
representatives of a unit of his employees, usually a union, as "an accord as to terms 
which will govern hiring and work and pay"; that it results in what is frequently 
called a "trade agreement, rather than in a contract of employment"; and that in- 
dividual hirings take place under, and are subsidiary to, "the terms of the trade agree- 
ment."67 
Judge McGranery further relied upon the carefully considered opinion and de- 
cision by the Supreme Court of California in Levy v. Superior Court68 in which that 
court held that an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement between 
employer and union did not fall within the provision of Section i of the California 
arbitration statute which excludes arbitration provisions in contracts "pertaining to 
labor." 
Judge McGranery also was critical of Judge Parker's opinion in the United 
Furniture Workers case where he indicated that by the exclusion of the contracts of 
employment designated in Section I Congress intended to steer clear of "com- 
pulsory arbitration" of labor disputes. Said Judge McGranery:69 
This Court considers, however, that the enactment of a law by the Congress providing 
for the enforcement of an arbitration contract "voluntarily and solemnly entered into" 
66 
321 U. S. 332 (I944). 6 Id. at 335, 336. 
68 
15 Cal. 2d 692, I04 P.2d 770, 774 (I940). 
69 United Office and Professional Workers of America, C.I.O., v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 88 F. Supp. 
602, 606 (E. D. Pa. I950). 
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[quoting from Senate Committee Report 536] between an employer and a union is no 
more objectionable than any other provision for the specific enforcement of contracts, 
nor does it in any way approach compulsory arbitration. It is logical to conclude that the 
Congress was avoiding the specific enforcement of contracts for personal services. 
Judge McGranery did not determine whether or not the given collective bar- 
gaining agreement involved "commerce." Granting his ruling that the collective 
bargaining agreement is not a "contract of employment" under the exclusion in 
Section I, can an arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agreement be 
enforced under Sections 4 or 5 if it is not in a "maritime transaction" or in a con- 
tract involving "commerce"? As reported above, the Judge indicated that, with the 
Donahue and Watkins cases and Judge Parker's opinion in the United Furniture 
Workers case, it might be enforced under those Sections. 
It remains to note the decision of District Judge Weinfeld in Lewittes & Sons v. 
United Furniture Workers in I951.70 Being in the second circuit the rulings in the 
Donahue and Watkins cases by Judge Goodrich, in the Agostini Bros. Co. and United 
Furniture Workers cases by Judge Parker, and that in the Gatlifi Coal Co. case by 
Judge Hamilton were not binding upon the court. The employer sued the union 
for damages for alleged breach of the no-strike provision in their collective bargain- 
ing agreement as did the employer in the United Furniture Workers case. The 
union moved for stay of trial relying on Section 3 of the Act. Judge Weinfeld 
noted that "no relief is sought under Section 4 to compel the parties to proceed to 
arbitration."71 He granted the stay. He sided with Judge McGranery and held 
that the collective bargaining agreement was not a "contract of employment" within 
the exclusion in Section i. One of the two grounds upon which the plaintiff-em- 
ployer resisted the application for the stay was that the exclusion in Section I con- 
trolled Section 3. The judge reviewed the decisions in the Gatliff Coal Co., United 
Furniture Workers, and Watkins cases on the question whether the exclusion in Sec- 
tion i "is applicable only to those sections of the Act in which 'commerce' appears or 
whether it applies to the entire Act, including Section 3 which makes no mention 
of 'commerce.' "72 While observing that the conclusion on this question "is not 
dispositive of the motion for a stay of the pending action" because the collective bar- 
gaining agreement is not a "contract of employment" under Section i, he found 
"more convincing" the dissenting opinion of Judge McAllister in the Watkins case 
and the ruling in the Gatlif Coal Co. case, namely, that the exclusion applies to the 
entire Act, including Section 3. "The placing of the exception," he said,73 "in the 
definition section demonstrates legislative intent that the exception is applicable to 
the entire Act and not merely to some sections thereof. Moreover, the caption to 
Section i reads: '. . . exceptions to operation of title' (italics by the Court)-further 
indication that the exception was meant to apply to the entire Act"; and so it should 
70 
95 F. Supp. 85I (S. D. N. Y. I951). 
1 Id. at 853. 
Id. at 854. 
3 Id. at 855. 
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be deemed to exclude "contracts of employment of workers engaged in commerce 
from the scope of Section 3." 
Judge Weinfeld also observed that the question as to the scope of the exclusion in 
Section i had not been determined in the second circuit, but that the court of 
appeals for that circuit "suggested" in Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod 
Carriers74 "that contracts of employment in interstate commerce are excluded from 
the Act, or in other words, that the exception applies to the entire Act."75 
As in the case of Judge McGranery's granting the union's application under 
Section 4 in the United Office & Professional Workers case, so with respect to Judge 
Weinfeld's grant of stay under Section 3, it does not appear that precise ruling was 
intended on the question whether the collective bargaining agreement containing the 
arbitration provision (granting the agreement is not a "contract of employment" 
under the exclusion in Section i) must constitute, or be contained in a "maritime 
transaction" or in "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce" under 
Section 2. He did, however, before reporting his conclusion upon the effect of the 
exclusion in Section i (as being from the whole Act) and its relation to Section 3, 
declare that "the Court must necessarily consider the interrelation of Sections 2 and 
3." "The question thus arises," he said, "whether, despite the broad language 
of Section 3, the power to grant a stay is restricted only to such arbitration agreements 
as are made valid by Section 2, that is those involving 'maritime' or 'commerce' 
transactions." He concluded in this connection that "It is clear that Section 3 is not 
limited by the provisions of Section 2." Perhaps it may be concluded from this that 
Judge Weinfeld intended to hold, or at least to indicate his belief that it is not 
necessary that the collective bargaining agreement constitute or be contained in a 
"maritime transaction" or in a "contract evidencing a transaction in commerce" to 
sustain stay of trial of a suit brought in disregard of the arbitration provision therein. 
It remains to read how the general problem returned to the Court of Appeals of 
the Third Circuit in 195I in Amalgamated Ass'n etc. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound 
Lines78 and how the court handled it. Judge Goodrich did not sit on the case. 
Judge Hastie wrote the unanimous opinion of the court. 
It was held that an application for an order to arbitrate brought by a union 
against the company based upon an arbitration provision in their written collective 
bargaining agreement and Section 4 of the Act should be denied. The company 
had moved to dismiss the application on the ground that the court had no juris- 
diction under the Act to grant it. This motion was granted in the court below. 
The application disclosed diversity of citizenship of the parties and that the matter 
in controversy exceeded $3,000. In holding that the application was properly dis- 
missed the court abandoned the view which the court took in the Donahue and 
Watkins cases that the exclusion of the designated contracts of employment in 
Section i was a subtraction only from "commerce" as defined in that Section. It 
74 I82 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950). 7 95 F. Supp. at 855. 
7e 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1951), and see 193 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952). 
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ruled that the exclusion should be judged as effective with respect to the whole 
Act. It sided with the Gatlifi Coal Co. and United Furniture Workers decisions on 
the point. Secondly, it ruled the collective bargaining agreement to be a contract of 
employment (and the employees being engaged in interstate commerce) within the 
exclusion in Section i. No reference was made in this connection to the decisions 
by Judges McGranery and Weinfeld.77 
The decision upon the first point was based upon the proposition that the catch 
line above Section i was added in the 1947 re-enactment of the Act. After calling 
attention to the foregoing opposing views of the courts of appeals on the scope of 
the exclusion, Judge Hastie announced the ruling as follows:78 
With the Courts of Appeals thus divided on the construction of the exception, Con- 
gress, in I947, reenacted and codified the Arbitration Act as Title 9 of the United States 
Code. The text was not changed. But the catch line which the compilers of the United 
States Code had inserted at the beginning of Section i of the Arbitration Act when it was 
included as Section i in Title 9 of the Code, and which had not appeared in the original 
Act,79 was now "enacted into positive law" as follows: "?I 'Maritime transactions' and 
'commerce' defined; exceptions to operation of title." 
This history considered, the company contends and the district court apparently de- 
cided that by the newly enacted catch line to Section i, Congress resolved the disagree- 
ment between circuits and approved the construction theretofore placed on the excepting 
language by the 6th Circuit. Moreover, since the codification the Court of Appeals for 
the 4th Circuit has adopted the construction of the 6th Circuit, although upon reasoning 
which indicates that it would have done so even under the original enactment. Inter- 
national Union United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 4 Cir., 
1948, i68 F.2d 33. 
Unquestionably, the original text was ambiguous. Enacting a catch line rather 
than amending the text is an unusual method of removing ambiguity in a text. But in 
this case we think the enactment serves that purpose. The only alternative would be to 
declare that the catch line is without significance. . . . 
Accordingly, we conclude that our earlier construction of the exception is inconsistent 
with the intention of Congress as subsequently made manifest. ... It follows that arbitra- 
tion of a dispute arising out of a "contract of employment" cannot be required under 
that Title. 
The novelty of the effect given this catch line aside, we conclude that the court 
cannot be supported in its conclusion as to the significance given by it to the line 
without noting that it was in the Code, 1940 edition. Furthermore, the legislative 
7"7The case was argued October 2, 195I. Judge McGranery's opinion was filed February 4, 1950; 
Judge Weinfeld's opinion March I, i95I. 
78 I92 F.2d at 312-313. 
79 The original Act did have the following catch lines dispersed from top to bottom of Section 
I on its right-hand margin in the Statutes (43 Stat. Ch. 213, p. 883) as follows: "United States Arbi- 
tration Act." "Definitions." "Maritime transactions." "Commerce." "Not applicable to employment 
contracts of workers" (italics supplied). 
But more important still, Section I of Title 9 of the U. S. Code, 1940 Edition, carried the same, 
identical catch line. See supra note i. Judge Hamilton appears to have recognized in the Gatlifi Coal 
Co. case, supra note 49 (decided in 1944), that the exception was from the operation of "the title." 
See his opinion as quoted supra, p. 607. 
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history repeatedly discloses that it was intended that there should be no change in 
the original Act.8 
In holding that collective bargaining agreements between an employer and a 
union of its employees were "contracts of employment" within that term as used in 
the exclusion in Section I, the court pointed out that Justice Jackson's opinion in 
1. I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, was identifying collective bar- 
gaining agreements for a different purpose from that involved here; that, accordingly, 
it was not controlling here; nor, indeed, persuasive. Also, that to apply the Arbitra- 
tion Act to arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements, would entail 
undesired interference of the federal bench in the settlement of labor disputes among 
the classes of workers covered by the exclusion in Section i.81 Said the court in this 
connection :82 
Widespread dissatisfaction with compulson from the federal bench in labor disputes 
during the era in which the statute was passed83 was paralleled by the existence of admin- 
istrative rather than judicial machinery for settlement of labor disputes in the case 
of both "classes of workers" specified in Section I .... For Congress to have included 
in the Arbitration Act judicial intervention in the arbitration of disputes about collective 
bargaining involving these two classes would have created pointless friction in an al- 
ready sensitive area as well as wasteful duplication. It is reasonable, therefore, to believe 
that the avoidance of an undesirable consequence in the field of collective bargaining was 
a principal purpose of excepting contracts of employment from the Act. In these cir- 
cumstances the phrase "contracts of employment" should be construed to include collective 
bargaining agreements. Finally, while the situation existing in cases of seamen and 
railroad employees clarifies the meaning of the statute its terms also include "any other 
classes of workers" in interstate commerce. Such a class is involved here. 
so The purpose of the 1947 legislation was declared to be to "Codify and Enact into Positive Law 
Title 9 of the United States Code, Entitled Arbitration." It was pointed out by Mr. Robinson who 
introduced the bill (HR. 2084) into the House and by Assistant Attorney General McGregor in a 
letter to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (SR 664, 8oth Congress) that, while the U. S. Code was 
extremely valuable, its usefulness "was somewhat circumscribed by the fact that it has never been 
enacted into law." Five separate titles of the Code, including Title 9, were submitted to the Congress 
at the same time and were severally passed as separate titles to give them the status of "positive law." 
(Compare the Preface to The Code of the Laws, reported supra note i.) 
During debate on these titles in the House (there was no debate in the Senate), Mr. Robinson was 
repeatedly questioned whether any change in existing law was being made by the five bills. In reply 
Mr. Robinson recurringly answered: "I understand there is no change whatsoever in the law as it 
is written on the books today." And when referring specifically to the enactment of Title 9, Mr. 
Robinson answered: "This bill makes no change in existing law." 93 CONG. REC. 5029, 5043 (I947). 
It is equally clear from this legislative history that the 1947 enactment involved no intent of the 
Congress to resolve the conflict in the circuit courts over the operation of the exclusion of the "contracts 
of employment" in Section I. As "no change" in the existing law was intended, so was no conflict 
in its application resolved. 
81 This question whether collective bargaining agreements are included in "contracts of employment" 
was deemed open in the third circuit. Said the court in this connection: "Decison that such inclusion 
was intended is necessarily implicit in Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, supra, and International Union United 
Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., supra. We did not have occasion to decide the 
issue in Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co. and Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co. cases, supra." 192 
F.2d at 313. 
82 I92 F.2d at 313-314. Compare re "compulsion from the federal bench" under the Federal Railway 
Labor Act, Delaware & Hudson R. Corp. v. Williams, 129 F.2d II (7th Cir. 1942). 
8 A footnote at this point by the court sets forth that: "The familiar Norris LaGuardia Act, 47 
Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. ?ioi, was the national legislative culmination of this dissatisfaction." 
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These contradictions and uncertainties as to the law of the Act in the different 
circuits are manifest warnings to employers and unions who may contemplate the 
aid of the United States Arbitration Act in connection with arbitration provisions 
in their collective bargaining agreements. They will find it expedient to consider 
whether in a given case it may best serve their purposes to stipulate their arbitra- 
tion provisions out of the United States Act until a more uniform judicial administra- 
tion of it is determined. 
The review of the foregoing cases indicates that part of this confusion could be 
obviated were Section 3 construed in deference to Section 2 which is the key section 
of the Act in declaring the purpose of the Act as to the arbitration agreements 
qualifying thereunder. The courts, if they will, can readily overcome their over- 
extension of the coverage of Section 3 and accord it its correlative function with 
Sections 4 and 5 in accomplishing the declared purpose of the Act as set down in 
Section 2. 
It likewise lies with the courts to get together in respect to the function and 
content of the limitation of Section i relating to the designated "contracts of em- 
ployment." Once Section 3 (as well as Sections 4 and 5) is properly correlated with 
Section 2 it will be immaterial whether the exclusion in Section i is subtracted from 
"commerce" in Section I or from the whole Act. As soon as the limitation in 
Section i is subtracted, by either device of construction, from Section 2, it will take 
the arbitration provisions in the designated contracts of employment out of the 
declared purpose of that Section and outside Sections 3, 4, 5 and their remedies. 
Shall the content of the exclusion of Section i be broadly or narrowly construed? 
Shall collective bargaining agreements between an employer and a union of em- 
ployees who are seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged 
in foreign or interstate commerce, be identified as "contracts of employment" of 
those seamen, railroad employees, or other class of workers engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce? 
In considering these questions it is of dubious aid to accept Judge Parker's sug- 
gestion as voiced in the United Furniture Workers case, that the Congress "was steer- 
ing clear of compulsory arbitration of labor disputes." The term "compulsory arbitra- 
tion" is quite remote from the arbitral process predicated upon an agreement of the 
parties to arbitrate their controversies before arbitrators whom they shall appoint.84 
It is equally unfortunate to analogize the issue of making irrevocable and specifically 
enforceable arbitration provisions in contracts of employment to the issue of specific 
performance of employment contracts themselves-which the courts are reluctant to 
grant. To accord irrevocability and specific enforceability to arbitration provisions 
in such contracts does not involve specific performance of the employment contract 
either on the part of the employer as to hiring or as to the employee as to working. 
84 Concerning the identity of "compulsory arbitration," see Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 
267 U. S. 552 (1924); Van Riper v. Traffic Tel. Workers' Fed. of New Jersey, 2 N. J. 335, 66 A.2d 
6I6 (1949); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 5 N. J. 354, 75 A.2d 721 (1950). 
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Only when an award is rendered which requires the employer to hire or the em- 
ployee to work will an issue of specific performance of the employment contract 
emerge and then may the courts readily and properly exercise their equitable dis- 
cretion to refuse specific enforcement of the award. 
When the United States Act was enacted in I925 labor unions and employer 
groups had varying views as to the feasibility of arbitration of labor controversies. 
Some favored the enactment of a state arbitration statute like the New York Arbi- 
tration Law of 1920; some did not. Sometimes one or the other, or both groups, 
entered no appearance for or against a pending bill looking to such an act. The 
New York law of 1920 contained no such limitation as Section i of the United States 
Act. Some of the other state arbitration statutes contain some such limitation; others 
do not, as pointed out supra note 47. In short, when the United States Act was 
enacted there was no general, nor national, consensus among either labor unions or 
employer groups for or against an arbitration statute like it being made applicable 
or inapplicable to employment contracts or to collective contracts between an em- 
ployer and a union of his employees. Indeed, the principal impetus for these earlier 
arbitration statutes was to facilitate "commercial arbitration" (i.e., the arbitration of 
controversies arising out of general commercial contracts). It also will be recalled 
that when the United States Act became law the modern collective bargaining 
agreement had not gained its present identity or legal status and had not come to 
embrace the functions which attend it today in the field of industrial relations. By 
the same token the individual's "employment contract" had not become so subordi- 
nated to the general agreement. 
Absent more driving, positive background to give the limitation of Section i 
a comprehensive prohibitive role one finds it reasonable to accept Judge McGranery's 
observations upon the development of national policy favoring the enforcement of 
collective bargaining agreements through judicial and quasi-judicial process rather 
than by economic force, and that policy will be best served by according arbitration 
provisions therein recognition under the Act if they otherwise qualify under the 
Act, including Section 2. 
It remains to note these further considerations concerning the foregoing ex- 
clusion in Section i. (I) It does not cover "contracts of employment" of all em- 
ployees-instead, it names only "seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of 
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" (italics supplied). Absent the 
involvement of employees designated in the exclusion there is no occasion to de- 
termine the scope or operation of the exclusion as such. (2) Granting that a col- 
lective bargaining agreement between an employer and a union of his employees 
who are of one of the foregoing classes ("seamen, railroad employees, or any other 
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce") is held to be outside 
the exclusion of Section i as not being a "contract of employment" as contemplated 
by the exclusion, it seems quite clear that since the employees are engaged either in 
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foreign or in interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction of admiralty, the col- 
lective bargaining agreement may qualify either as a "maritime transaction," or if 
not, as a "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce" so that the arbitra- 
tion provision therein would qualify under Section 2. (3) Given either a "contract 
of employment" or a collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a 
union of his employees who are outside the categories designated in the exclusion 
("seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or in- 
terstate commerce") it seems clear that it will not plausibly fit into the Act either 
as a "maritime transaction" or "commerce" and that an arbitration provision therein 
will not qualify under Section 2. 
V 
CONCERNING ARBITRATION PROVISIONS DESIGNATING WHERE ARBITRATIONS 
SHALL BE HELD 
Two general questions have been raised in the federal courts with respect to 
arbitration provisions which designate a place in a foreign country or in a state 
where arbitrations thereunder shall be held. They are as follows: (i) If the arbitra- 
tion provision otherwise qualifies under the Act (Section 2) will such designation 
disqualify the arbitration provision from any or all of the remedies of Sections 3, 
4, 5, or 8 of the Act? (2) Will the courts, in their discretion, disregard the designa- 
tion and order the arbitration to be held within the district of the court's jurisdiction? 
Diversities and contradictions in the law of the Act again appear. 
Two district courts, in admiralty proceedings,85 denied, it seems, both a stay and 
order to arbitrate because the arbitration provisions called for arbitration in London. 
These courts voiced the opinion that the United States Act does not authorize 
any court of the United States to apply the Act to an arbitration agreement which 
stipulates for foreign arbitrations. This opinion was based chiefly upon one sentence 
of Section 4 of the Act. That Section provides motion proceedings to obtain a 
general order against a recalcitrant party to proceed to arbitration in compliance with 
the agreement. The particular sentence of the Section which was deemed controlling 
in these cases, together with the sentence immediately preceding it, reads as follows: 
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agree- 
ment for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make 
an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement. The hearing and proceedings under such agreement shall be within the 
district in which the petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed (italics sup- 
plied). 
The succeeding sentences of the Section provide for the trial of the making of 
the arbitration agreement and the alleged default thereunder when these matters 
86 The Silverbrook, I8 F.2d 144 (E. D. La. 1927); The Beechwood, 35 F.2d 4I (S. D. N. Y. 
1929). 
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(or either of them) are put in issue, and when the making of the agreement and 
the alleged default are found, 
the court shall make an order summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbi- 
tration in accordance with the terms thereof (italics supplied). 
Section 8 of the Act, which also was involved in the foregoing cases, provides as 
follows: 
?8. If the basis of jurisdiction be a cause of action otherwise justiciable in admirality, then, 
notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the party claiming to be aggrieved may 
begin his proceeding hereunder by libel and seizure of the vessel or other property of the 
other party according to the usual course of admiralty proceedings, and the court shall 
then have jurisdiction to direct the parties to proceed with the arbitration and shall retain 
jurisdiction to enter its decree upon the award (italics supplied). 
In The Silverbrook, the first of the foregoing cases, the court observed generally 
that86 
the act seems to contemplate only such arbitration agreements as would be or could be 
carried out in the United States, within the jurisdiction of and under the control and 
orders of the United States Courts.... 
After reviewing the several sections of the statute the court elaborated upon this 
view as follows:87 
The courts of the United States are of limited jurisdiction, being confined to the specific 
grants thereof by Congress. Although the basis of jurisdiction in this case is a cause of 
action otherwise justiciable in admiralty, and begun by a libel and seizure of a vessel 
according to the usual course of admiralty proceedings, and therefore of the class con- 
templated by section 8 of the United States Arbitration Act, this court is without juris- 
diction to direct the parties to proceed to arbitration as required by the concluding clause 
of that section, because the place and manner of arbitration prescribed by the terms of the 
contract are beyond the jurisdiction of this court, since the hearings and proceedings there- 
under cannot be held conformable to the terms of this statute, and particularly to section 
4, which requires the arbitration to proceed within the district in which the petition for 
an order directing such arbitrations was filed. This court cannot direct and otherwise 
supervise and conclude an arbitration to be held in London, or assume to vacate, modify, 
or correct any award that might be made there, or, indeed anywhere, except within this 
district, nor has it power as a court of admiralty to arbitrarily reform, or modify the terms 
of the contract by ordering an arbitration elsewhere or otherwise than agreed upon by the 
parties. 
It is difficult indeed to subscribe to these rulings. Although the arbitration pro- 
vision otherwise qualifies under the Act (Section 2), the parties' stipulation of the 
place of arbitration outside the jurisdiction of the court-in these cases, in London- 
apparently disqualifies the agreement from the whole Act. The Act comprehends 
arbitration provisions in "maritime transactions" and in contracts evidencing trans- 
actions involving "commerce." The place of arbitration is likely to assume consider- 
86 I8 F.2d at 146 (italics supplied). 
s87d. at 147 (italics supplied). 
620 
ARBITRATION UNDER THE UNITED STATES ARBITRATION ACT 62I 
able importance to the parties to such transactions and commerce, and it is not to be 
expected that the parties will always fix the place in the United States. Accordingly, 
it seems, there should be required more compelling reasons than were advanced in 
the foregoing cases, to render the whole Act inapplicable because the parties desig- 
nate the place of arbitration in a foreign country. 
By Section 3 of the Act a stay of trial shall be granted "until such arbitration 
has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement" (italics supplied). 
None of the difficulties envisaged in the two foregoing cases seems to present any 
real obstacle against applying Section 3. A conforming order is readily drawn and 
entered, and will be equally effective upon the suit or action in the court whether 
the arbitration is to be held abroad or at home. 
In a subsequent decision in the District Court for the Southern District of New 
York stay was granted in admiralty proceedings pursuant to Section 3 on an arbitra- 
tion provision calling for arbitration in London.88 Said District Judge Patterson:89 
The fact that the arbitration agreed upon in the charter party is to be held in a foreign 
country does not prejudice the owner's right to a stay of proceedings in this court. 
Absent special "equitable considerations" of hardship, it seems clear that the 
remedies of Sections 4, 5, and 8 of the Act, like that of Section 3, should be accorded 
arbitration provisions, notwithstanding a foreign place of arbitration is stipulated. 
As we have pointed out above, a stay under Section 3, alone, leads to frustration and 
uncertainty of any arbitration being accomplished. 
While, as a matter of technical interpretation of Section 4 with its own special 
language as contained in the foregoing sentence, the question is not beyond doubt, 
only modest "new orientation" will, we believe, support our conclusion. 
88 The Quarrington Court, 25 F. Supp. 665 (S. D. N. Y. I938). Accord, International Refugee 
Organization v. Republic S. S. Corp., 93 F. Supp. 798 (D. Md. 1950). Judge Patterson made no 
mention of The Beechwood, stpra note 85. The order of stay in The Quarrington Court was reversed 
on appeal, but not because of the provision for arbitration in London. Indeed, it was indicated by the 
court of appeals that, absent other controlling considerations, the order of stay would have been 
proper. The Quarrington Court, I02 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1939). 
The denial of stay in The Silverbrook, supra note 85 had been criticized earlier in Danielsen v. 
Entre Rios Rys. Co. 22 F.2d 326, 327 (D. Md., 1927): "Such a holding seems erroneous under the 
broad language of section 3, granting that section 4 . . . of the act limits the jurisdiction of the court 
to order arbitration in connection with agreements performable within the United States." 
Danielsen v. Entre Rios Rys. Co. supra, and The Fredensbro, I8 F.2d 983 (E. D. La. 1927), involved 
libels in admiralty; the charter parties upon which the proceedings were based contained arbitration 
provisions calling for arbitrations in London. Exceptions to the jurisdiction of the court, including 
one based on the arbitration provision, were overruled. There were no rulings pertinent to the question 
at hand upon the applicability of Sections 3, 4, 5, or 8 of the Act. As a matter of pleading it may be 
conceded that an arbitration provision does not go to the jurisdiction of the court; and especially is this 
so in admiralty proceedings involving Section 8. See American Sugar Refining Co. v. Anaconda, 
138 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1943), afg'd, 322 U. S. 42 (I944); Karno Smith Co. v. School District of City 
of Scranton, 44 F. Supp. 860 (M.D. Pa. 1942). Application should be made for an order for stay of 
trial under Section 3 or for the proper order under the other sections. Compare Evans v. Hudson Coal 
Co., I65 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. I948). 
Concerning The Volsino, 32 F.2d 357 (E. D. N. Y. 1929), another case in this earlier group, see 
supra note i. 
89 25 F. Supp. at 666. He cited Shanferoke Coal & Supply Co. v. Westchester Service Corp., 
293 U. S. 449 (1935), which is considered below. 
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Section 4 embraces enforcement orders in two situations as follows. (i) When the 
making of the agreement for arbitration and the alleged default of the defending 
party are not put in issue; and (2) when these matters (or either of them) are put 
in issue and after the preliminary trial, are found in favor of the moving party. 
The troublesome sentence prescribing that the arbitral hearing and proceedings 
under the arbitration provision "shall be held within the district in which the petition 
for an order directing such arbitration is filed," appears only in succession to the 
provision for the first foregoing order (it is not included in the text of Section 5, 
nor of Section 8). Provisions governing the granting of both orders repeat the 
very same text, namely, "the court shall make an order summarily directing the 
parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof" (italics 
supplied). 
The position of the troublesome sentence is somewhat awkward if it were in- 
tended to apply to both orders under Section 4, i.e., an order to arbitrate whether 
without, or after, the prescribed trial of issues as to the making of the arbitration 
agreement or the default. Granting that the awkwardness could be ameliorated by 
repeating it to cover both orders or by translating it to the end of the Section so as 
to apply to both orders, it would not displace the twice repeated text of that Section 
that orders thereunder shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration "in accordance 
with the terms of the agreement." 
In short, the position of the troublesome sentence is not so commanding that it 
should be held to nullify both positive provisions of the same Section that the order 
to proceed shall issue "in accordance with the terms" of the clause. It seems more 
reasonable to take the position that while Section 4 with the foregoing troublesome 
sentence (that the arbitration hearing and proceedings "shall be held within the 
district in which the petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed") should 
be construed as applying to an arbitration which is held under either of the fore- 
going orders for arbitration, it should so apply only when there is occasion for such 
provision to be effective, namely, when the arbitration agreement does not specify 
another place (outside the district) where the arbitration shall be held. These con- 
clusions would likewise facilitate the administration of Sections 5 and 8 of the Act.90 
With respect to the last clause in Section 8, which provides that the court shall 
have jurisdiction "to direct the parties to proceed with the arbitration and shall retain 
jurisdiction to enter its decree upon the award," it is easier to regard it as enabling, 
0 In the Senate hearings upon the original bill it is indicated that the foregoing sentence of Section 
4 was conceived and added to the bill so that "it is not permissible to drag a man across the country 
to arbitrate." 66 CONG. REC. 2761 (I925). 
While this slogan might have some appeal in behalf of the "underdog," it is impossible to identify 
in advance who will be dragging whom to arbitration and it seems rough indeed to deny absolutely 
the power and privilege of competent parties to contract where their arbitrations shall take place. We 
believe that it is more plausible in proceedings under Sections 4, 5, and 8 to honor the agreement of 
the parties if they fix a place for their arbitrations unless and until substantial inconvenience and in- 
justices are made to appear. If no place of arbitration is designated or if the place designated is to be 
disregarded for cause, it seems equally clear that the hearing is properly ordered within the district of 
the federal district court having jurisdiction and venue as prescribed in the U. S. C. ??I39I and 1404(a). 
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and inclusive of an arbitration had and award rendered in a foreign arbitration, than 
as being restrictive and applicable only to an arbitration which is conducted within 
the district in which the libel and the petition for the order to proceed are filed.91 
We now turn to the decisions under the Act dealing with an arbitration provision 
calling for arbitration within or outside the district of the federal court but in a 
designated state of the United States. Will the view of the foregoing courts relating 
to arbitration provisions fixing arbitration in a foreign country be equally applicable? 
And suppose that the arbitration statute of the state is of the same general pattern as 
the United States Act, and further that the arbitration provision may qualify there- 
under? 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has considered this general problem 
in two cases which were brought in a federal district court for a district of California. 
In the first, California Prune & Apricot Growers' Ass'n v. Catz American Co.,92 
the arbitration provision called for arbitration of disputes arising out of a contract to 
buy and sell prunes before the Dried Fruit Association of California. The petitioner 
(appellee) contracted to buy appellant's entire stock of 1926 California prunes. 
Controversy arose and the buyer, a New York corporation, petitioned for an order 
against the seller, a California corporation, to proceed with arbitration. The pe- 
titioner invoked the jurisdiction of the district court on the ground of diversity of 
citizenship of the parties. The district court granted the petition and ordered the 
parties to proceed to arbitrate according to the terms of the arbitration provision. 
The court of appeals reversed. The issue, as reported by the court of appeals, was 
whether the district court had jurisdiction to order arbitration in accord with the 
California arbitration statute. Why this was made the issue is not entirely clear, ex- 
91 The suggestion in The Silverbrook, supra note 85, that the court could not take jurisdiction to 
accord the remedies of Sections 3 or 4 of the Act with respect to the foreign arbitration "since the 
hearing and proceedings thereunder cannot be held conformable to the terms of the statute," (18 F.2d 
at I47) does not appear to have sufficient basis to support the court's ruling. Indeed, it is not clear 
what tlhe court meant, if more than that the arbitration hearing would not proceed conformably to the 
statute within the district in which the petition is filed if it were had in London. Otherwise the foreign 
hearing and award could follow the statute. Whether the hearing (or the award) shall have conformed 
to the statute in the given case would be open to challenge and determination were the statute ever 
invoked to enforce or vacate an award rendered therein. 
That the court could not, as was said in The Silverbrook (187 F.2d at 147), "direct and otherwise 
supervise and conclude an arbitration to be held in London" may be conceded, but neither could it, nor 
would it, do so if the arbitration were to be held within the district. The court is not expected, nor 
authorized, to "supervise" or "conclude" the arbitration. 
Nor does it seem material, though voiced in The Silverbrook, that the court could not "assume to 
vacate, modify or correct any award that might be made there [in London]." 18 F.2d at 147. These 
considerations are more remote and speculative than the court seemed to indicate. Whether there will 
be cause under the Act to vacate or to modify or correct will depend upon what happens in the pro- 
ceedings and in rendering the award. It seems clear that the court would retain jurisdiction after an 
order entered pursuant to either Section 3, 4, 5, or 8, sufficient at least to receive a motion to confirm 
an award under Section 9, or to vacate an award under Section o0, or to modify or correct under 
Section I . Section 8 seems particularly clear on this point. See, in this connection, The Gerald A. 
Fagan, 49 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. I931). 
92 6 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1932). Compare Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Ins. Co. No. America, 25 F.2d 
930 (9th Cir. 1928) in which stay of trial was granted relying upon the California arbitration statute. 
No reference was made, however, to the matter now under consideration. 
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cept that the parties argued the case on that basis and the appellee sought to sustain 
the order by the district court on the basis that the federal court in this diversity case 
should accord it the same relief as it would be entitled to under the state statute. 
Perhaps the petitioner (appellee) feared that the contract containing the arbitration 
provision did not, on the facts, constitute a contract evidencing a transaction in- 
volving "commerce" as required in Section 2 of the United States Act and that, 
therefore, the arbitration provision did not qualify under that Act. Otherwise, it 
seems, the petitioner (appellee) should have invoked the United States Act and 
sought the very order which, apparently, the district court granted, namely, that 
the arbitration proceed in accordance with the terms of the arbitration provision. 
Under such order, it seems clear that the arbitration proceedings and the rendering 
of the award should follow the United States Act (not the California Act if and as 
it differs from the United States Act with respect to these matters) to qualify the 
award for confirmation and enforcement under Section 9 of the Act. 
The court of appeals in deciding the issue as presented commented as follows:93 
The act [of California] itself discloses that it was the intention of the Legislature to pro- 
vide a procedure peculiarly adaptable to the state courts of California; and in view of 
many of the provisions of the act, it would be difficult if not impossible to harmonize it 
with the federal law and procedure. 
The court also added: 
The law that controls in the matter of the remedy is the law of the forum, and no other. 
The federal courts are without jurisdiction or power to enforce a purely remedial or pro- 
cedural state law. 
The subsequent case, Hudson Lumber Co. v. United States Plywood Corp?4 
involved an action for declaratory ruling as to the interpretation of a contract be- 
tween the parties. It was brought originally in a California state court and was re- 
moved by the defendant to a federal district court for a district of California. Appli- 
cation for stay was made by defendant relying upon Section 3 of the United States 
Act. What was the basis upon which jurisdiction of the federal court was invoked, 
whether on diversity of citizenship, or otherwise, does not appear, nor does it appear 
how the arbitration provision qualified under the Act (Section 2). These matters 
were not put in issue nor considered by the court. The arbitration provision in the 
contract provided that disputes arising thereunder "shall be submitted to arbitration 
in the State of California pursuant to the Rules of the American Arbitration Asso- 
ciation. . . "95 Held, that stay of trial was properly granted. No question was raised, 
nor was any considered by the court, concerning the significance or effect of the 
foregoing provision that arbitration should be in the state of California.96 
93 60 F.2d at 790. 94 8I F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1950). 95 Id. at 930. 
96The Gerald A. Fagan, 49 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1931) involved a libel in admiralty in rem and in 
personam and alleged breach by ship owner of a contract to supply canal tonnage to charterer. It was 
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In the second circuit in Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service 
Corp.97 plaintiff seller, a Delaware corporation, sued the buyer, a New York corpora- 
tion, in the federal District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover 
damages for alleged breach of the contract. The contract contained an arbitration 
provision which stipulated that if an arbitration shall fail for any reason "either 
party may apply to the Supreme Court of the State of New York for an order com- 
pelling the specific performance of the arbitration agreement in accordance with 
the arbitration laws of the State of New York." 
The defendant invoked the enforcement of this provision by an application for 
stay under Section 3 of the United States Act. The district court denied the motion 
on the ground that the terms of the arbitration provision confined the parties to an 
arbitration "in the Supreme Court of New York" and that a stay would involve 
such superintendence as the district court was unfitted to undertake. The order 
denying stay was reversed by the court of appeals. 
Judge Learned Hand voiced doubt as to the district judge's view that the 
arbitration provision necessarily limited the parties to an arbitration "in the state 
court" as follows:98 
We do not find it necessary to decide whether the arbitration clause at bar was limited to 
a proceeding in the state court. While it is certainly possible to read the language only as 
an addlition, redundant because already provided by law, and as not intended to prevent 
arbitration elsewhere, we are content to treat it as exclusive, as the judge did. 
Notwithstanding, therefore, that the arbitration provision may have been in 
tended to restrict its enforcement to the New York courts the district court was 
authorized and required to order the stay. 
In support of the ruling of the court of appeals, Judge Hand noted that Section 3 
"specifically provides for a stay, and we have only to decide whether it covers the 
situation; that is whether the arbitration must be in a federal court." (Just what the 
district judge and Judge Hand, respectively, may have meant by the arbitration being 
instituted in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. The contract contained an 
arbitration provision calling for arbitrations thereunder to be "before the Committee on Grain of the 
New York Produce Exchange." Without giving attention to the point now under consideration the 
district court ordered arbitration and thereafter entered final decree in admiralty confirming the award 
rendered in the arbitration. This decree was entered in reliance upon Section 8 of the Act and was 
affirmed by the court of appeals. 
In Petition of Pahlberg, 13I F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1942) charterers instituted libel in admiralty in 
the District Court for the Southern District of New York against ship owners to recover damages for 
alleged breach of agreement to charter. The charter party contained a provision for arbitration "to be 
referred to three persons at New York." Motion by the owners under Section 4 to order the charterers 
to proceed to arbitration and to appoint their arbitrator as agreed in the provision was granted by 
the district court, 43 F. Supp. 761 (S. D. N. Y. 1942). The order was affirmed on appeal by the 
court of appeals. The point now under consideration was not discussed. Like holding was made 
in Stathatos v. Arnold Bernstein Corp., 87 F. Supp. 1007 (S. D. N. Y. I950) (arbitration provision 
that controversies "be referred to three persons in the City of New York"). See also Arnold Bernstein 
Shipping Co. v. Tidewater Commercial Co., 84 F. Supp. 948 (D. Md. I949); Goldbill Trading & Ship 
Co. v. Caribbean Ship Co., 56 F. Supp. 31 (S. D. N. Y. I944). 
97 70 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. I934). 
98 Id. at 298. 
625 
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 
"in the Supreme Court of New York" or "in a federal court," is not clear.) Judge 
Hand concluded:99 "We can see no reason for a limited construction, and conclude 
that section 3 authorizes a stay even though the arbitration must take place beyond 
the jurisdiction of the court." 
Before coming to this conclusion, and, apparently in deciding whether the 
Section "covers the situation," he observed:100 
The decisions in the District courts are divided. The Silverbrook (D. C.) i8 F.2d 144, 
The Fredensbro (D. C.) i8 F.2d 983, and the Beechwood (D. C.) 35 F.2d 41, take the 
view of the judge below; Danielsen v. Entre Rios Rys. Co. (D. C.) 22 F.2d 326, and The 
Volsinio (D. C.) 32 F.2d 357 (semble), are contra.101 So too is In re Interocean Food 
Products, Inc. v. York Mercantile Co., 206 App. Div. 426, 201 N. Y. S. 536.102 
Although only the order denying a stay under Section 3 was in issue on the 
appeal, Judge Hand did add that on the basis of the foregoing view of the district 
court judge (conceded for purposes of the decision on appeal) that the arbitration 
provision restricted the parties to an arbitration in the supreme court of New York 
the district court could not "enforce the clause specifically" citing California Prune 
& Apricot Growers' Ass'n. 
In ruling upon the precise matter in issue, namely, that stay of trial was proper 
pursuant to Section 3, Judge Hand denied the validity of the district judge's view 
that to order the stay would require superintendence beyond the competence of the 
district court. He conceded that "it may from time to time be necessary for the 
court where the action is pending to consider how far he [the defendant obtaining 
the stay] has continued to perform. Even so, the superintendence involved is not 
beyond the compass of a court of equity.. .. " 
The Shanferoke case went to the Supreme Court on certiorari for review of the 
foregoing decision of the court of appeals. The decision was affirmed. The Supreme 
Court observed that the matter at issue before the courts below and before it con- 
cerned only the validity of a stay under Section 3 and did not concern any ques- 
tions of "specific enforcement" of the arbitration provision otherwise. Said the 
Court :103 
The contract does not in terms prohibit proceedings in the federal court. Whether it 
should be construed so as to exclude the bringing of a suit in the federal court to 
"9 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 
101 That we have difficulty with Judge Hand's alignment of the decisions in the cases cited, see, 
supra note 88. 
102 Supreme court decisions in New York are in accord that an out-of-state arbitration will not be 
ordered, but that a stay of trial will be. The court of appeals has not ruled upon these questions. The 
supreme court of Pennsylvania has ordered the out-of-state arbitration (Nippon Ki-Ito Kaisha, Lt'd v. 
Ewing-Thomas Corp., 313 Pa. 442, I70 Atl. 286 (I934), and so has the Essex County Court (New 
Jersey). In re California Lima Bean Growers Ass'n, 9 N. J. Misc. 362, I54 Atl. 532 (193I). See also 
Rosenthal v. Berman, 14 N. J. Super. 348, 82 A 2d. 455 (I95I), Sturges and Ives, Some Confusing 
Matters Relating to Arbitration in Pennsylvania, 99 U. OF PA. L. REV. 727, 757 (I95I). 
103 Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp., 293 U. S. 449, 452 (I935). That 
we have difficulty in identifying orders of stay under Section 3 as substantially different from "specific 
performance" orders under Sections 4, 5, or 8, see, supra, note 43. 
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compel specific performance of the agreement to arbitrate, we have no occasion to decide. 
For the District Court was not asked, in the proceedings now under review, to compel 
specific performance. The motion was to stay the action until arbitration shall have been 
had; and the direction of the Court of Appeals was limited to granting a stay. 
Notwithstanding this particularization of the issue to be decided in this case, 
namely, that it related only to a stay of trial and not to "specific performance" of 
the arbitration agreement, the Supreme Court did go on to observe as follows: "We 
think the Court of Appeals was clearly right in concluding that there is no reason 
to imply that the power to grant a stay is conditioned upon the existence of power 
to compel arbitration in accordance with ?4 of the Act." Why this was deemed 
pertinent in light of the foregoing statement of the limitation of the matter on review 
is not clear. Is it to be inferred that the Supreme Court intended to indicate that 
orders under Sections 4, 5, or 8 would have been beyond the jurisdiction of the district 
court in such a case as did Judge Hand? The statement as made seems not to have 
been at all necessary to the disposition of the cause in issue before the Court. 
In a footnote to the last quoted statement of the Supreme Court the following 
was appended:104 
In the lower federal courts there has been some difference of opinion as to whether a stay 
should be granted when the court is not in a position to compel arbitration. 
The Court cited the following cases to this statement:105 
Compare Danielsen v. Entre Rios Ry. Co., 22 F.2d 326, 328, with The Silverbrook, 18 
F.2d I44. See, too, The Beechwood, 35 F.2d 41; The Volsinio, 32 F.2d 357, 358; Ex 
parte De Simon, 36 F.2d 773; The Fredensbro, i8 F.2d 983.106 Interpretations of the 
English arbitration statutes are in accord with the view adopted here. [Citing British 
cases.] 
We have difficulty in finding from this review of the decisions any substantial 
basis under the Act for denying remedies under Sections 4, 5, or 8 because the parties 
have stipulated that the arbitration shall be held in a foreign place or elsewhere out- 
side the district of the Court. The Act, we submit, preponderates in text to require 
that such arbitration provisions (otherwise qualifying under the Act) shall, to the 
extent of the powers of the courts of the United States, be ordered enforced "in 
accordance with the terms" of the provisions. Difficulties of supervision or control 
over the arbitration are not real because supervision or control is not authorized or 
required under the Act even when the arbitration is had within the district over 
which the court has jurisdiction. 
But suppose that the out-of-state arbitration is stipulated and that jurisdiction 
under the Act to order performance under Sections 4, 5, or 8 "in accordance with 
the terms" of the provision is settled. Will the foreign or out-of-state arbitration be 
ordered without question as to the reasonableness of the order? It seems fair to 
104 Id. at 453. 105 Ibid. 
106 That we have difficulty with this alignment of the cases (as we did with that of Judge Hand, 
supra note soI) see, supra note 88. 
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conclude that the court, in hearing applications under those Sections should, in so 
far as they relate to the fixing of the place of arbitration, temper or deny the appli- 
cation when substantial and undue hardship to a party, which was not reasonably 
anticipated when the agreement was made, is made to appear by clear and substantial 
evidence. Indeed, we submit that the same consideration with respect to such 
arbitration provisions on that question should be deemed pertinent upon an appli- 
cation for order of stay of trial under Section 3.107 
Such a ruling may have been involved in a case before the Court of Appeals of 
the Ninth Circuit. In Continental Grain Co. v. Dant & Russell, Inc.108 the court of 
appeals affirmed an order of the District Court for the District of Oregon, which 
ordered arbitration within the district notwithstanding the arbitration provision 
called for arbitrations by three arbitrators in New York. The application was initi- 
ated in admiralty; the arbitration provision was in a charter party; the petitioner in- 
voked both Sections 4 and 5 of the Act to gain the court's general order to arbitrate 
and order that the defending party appoint its arbitrator pursuant to the arbitration 
provision. The defending party opposed the petition on grounds to the effect that 
its place of business was in Oregon, its witnesses were there, and petitioner had a 
place of business in Oregon; he alleged his willingness to arbitrate in Oregon but not 
in New York. The district court ordered that the arbitration proceed in Oregon. 
Petitioner appealed from the order. The court of appeals relied upon the sentence 
in Section 4, heretofore considered troublesome, as follows:109 
In the statute [Section 4] the clause under consideration with reference to the place of 
arbitration is in the form of a proviso reading as follows: ". . . the court shall make 
an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of 
the agreement: Provided, That the hearing and proceedings under such agreement shall 
be within the district in which the petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed." 
The court concluded as follows:10 
The appellant challenges the right of the court to order the arbitration within the district 
of Oregon because such an order does not conform to the agreement of the parties for an 
arbitration in New York. . . . The Appellant, having invoked the jurisdiction of the 
United States District Court for Oregon is hardly in a position to complain that it has 
exercised that jurisdiction in accordance with the statute giving it jurisdiction. 
In so far as the court relied only upon the troublesome sentence of Section 4 
to derive the foregoing decision, our foregoing considerations lead us to question its 
validity. In so far as it was prompted by considerations of unforeseen hardship to 
107 See supra note 43. 
When a place of arbitration is stipulated in an agreement of submission of a controversy already 
existing between the parties (as distinguished from a provision to arbitrate disputes arising in the future) 
it seems clear that substantial and undue hardship for the purpose now under consideration would be 
very difficult to establish. 108 II8 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. I94I). 
109 Id. at 968-969. 
110 Id. at 969. This ruling appears to run counter to the suggestion of the court in The Silverbrook, 
supra note 85, and quoted at p. 620 supra. 
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the defending party and correlative want of prejudice to the petitioner, we believe 
that the result should be sustained. There should, of course, be adequate balancing 
of the hardship and prejudice to the respective parties in determining whether or 
not their stipulation as to the place of arbitration shall be disregarded. The items 
urged by the defending party are suggestive, but the record of the case on this 
matter is scarcely adequate to judge their merit in the particular case. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We believe that the Act would be made to serve its purpose best if the courts 
of the different circuits would get together in uniform regard for the controlling 
effect of Section 2 of the Act. While this would limit the applicability of the Act, 
let its extension be determined and accomplished by legislative amendment. Di- 
versities and contradictions in the different circuits concerning what arbitration 
agreements may qualify under the Act for the various remedies of Sections 3, 4, 5, 
and 8 render the Act least useful to parties who may consider the use of arbitration 
agreements and arbitrations under it. We also believe that District Judges Mc- 
Granery and Weinfeld have been more realistic than their brethren by identifying 
collective bargaining agreements out of "contracts of employment" as the latter term 
is used in the exclusion in Section I. 
Arbitration statutes like the United States Act with provisions making qualifying 
arbitration agreements irrevocable and enforceable are, as pointed out above, effective 
to overcome common law revocability and non-enforceability. If parties wish to 
stipulate that the statute shall not apply to their arbitration agreements and arbitra- 
tions they may do so and engage common law. On the other hand, they are unable 
effectively to stipulate irrevocability and enforceability at common law. The statute 
provides the alternative-a freedom of choice as the parties shall agree. To facilitate 
this choice by the parties we believe that the United States Act should be extended 
by legislative amendment to cover arbitration agreements and controversies beyond 
those presently covered in Section 2 as we have suggested above. In furtherance of 
this end we submit that Section i should be repealed and that Section 2 should be 
amended to remove its reference to and dependence upon the definitions now in 
Section I. It also would be well, we submit, to amend Section 4 by eliminating the 
troublesome sentence discussed above. Clarity also could be added to several other 
sections by further refinement in draftsmanship. 
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